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ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose of this study is to examine how companies in Finland perform at the presence 
of share repurchase announcements. First purpose of the study was to investigate if 
Finnish companies experience any positive abnormal returns around the share 
repurchase announcement. Second research question was to examine if repurchasing 
companies experience negative abnormal returns prior the announcement, which would 
give support to the signalling hypothesis. In addition intra-industry comparison will be 
made in order to see if repurchase announcements have contagious or competitive effect 
on rival firms or whether the information in repurchase announcements is mainly firm-
specific. Also it is investigated whether there are differences between different 
industries on how markets react to repurchase announcements. 
 
Research was done for the companies which made a share repurchase announcement 
during years 1998 to 2005 in the Helsinki stock exchange. Study included 161 samples 
and 59 clean samples. Standard Event Study method was used when estimating 
abnormal returns and statistical significance was observed with the help of t-test. Event 
window ranged from twenty days before to ten days after the announcement. HEX-
portfolio index was used as a benchmark when investigating abnormal returns for the 
announcing firms and for the reference portfolio of rival firms.  
 
Results indicate that abnormal return for the five-day event window around the share 
repurchase announcement for the clean samples was 2.26 % and on day zero it was 1.30 
%, with same time periods for all the samples results were 0.93 % and 0.62 % 
respectively. Also negative abnormal returns were observed ranging from twenty to six 
days prior the announcement which gives support for the signalling hypothesis. In the 
intra-industry comparison there were not observed any competitive effect for rival firms 
and evidence for contagious effect was quite weak as well so conclusion was that 
positive market reaction from share repurchases is mainly firm-specific. In addition, 
there were not observed any differences between different industries on the reactions to 
repurchase announcements. 
 
KEYWORDS: Share repurchase, abnormal return, intra-industry comparison 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Purpose of this thesis is to shed some more light to the ongoing scientific conversation 
around share repurchases. This thesis brings new evidence from Finnish markets and 
gives some support to previous findings from Finnish markets as well. Thesis will be 
investigating how share prices are reacting to the share repurchase announcements, and 
also intra-industry comparison will be made.  
 
Stock repurchases are still somewhat young phenomenon in Finland, because 
corporations have not been able to buy back their own shares not until the reform of 
Companies Act in 1997. Since then amount of repurchase programs have steadily 
increased and nowadays it is quite common that companies are applying for permissions 
to start repurchases from shareholders meeting. For example in the year 2005 two thirds 
of the big companies in Helsinki Stock Exchange applied authorization for share 
repurchases and those authorizations aggregated together for over 8.4 billion euros 
(Pohjola 2005). Though, in quite many cases companies don’t even use authorization to 
repurchase shares even if they would have been granted to do so. For example in the 
year 2006 there were 40 repurchase authorizations in total and only one third of these 
authorizations were actually used. This indicates that companies tend to apply share 
repurchase authorizations for just in case they would want use that option. 
 
From the beginning of 1990 stock repurchases have increased heavily all over the 
world. For example in the United States, corporations have repurchased more stocks 
than they have sold in past few years. Grullon and Michaely (2002) resulted in their 
study that expenditures on share repurchase programs (relative to total earnings) 
increased from 4.8 % to 50.1 % in the year 1998. These figures clearly illustrate how 
the popularity of share repurchases has increased over the years. What are the reasons 
then, why corporations have started to use share repurchases more and more? Answer is 
not that clear as there might be lot of reasons why companies are using repurchases as a 
way to share profits and those motives will be presented in chapter three with more 
detail. Especially in the United States taxation is something that have been recognized 
as on of the main reasons why companies might prefer share repurchases over dividend 
payments. 
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Companies’ main purpose according to the general finance theory is to increase the 
value of their shareholders. Therefore when company is functioning profitably 
shareholders are eager to get part of that profit so that they would keep investing their 
money to that company in the future as well. Normal and commonly known method for 
profit sharing is naturally dividend payments, but since 1998 share repurchases have 
become another alternative for Finnish companies. Stock repurchases are basically just 
another way to share profits. Sometimes firm may think that better option is to buy back 
their own shares rather than for example raise dividends or make new investments. In 
theory if we ignore taxes and other imperfections stock holder's wealth stays the same 
whether company shares profits through dividends or by using stock repurchasing. Even 
though shareholder loses the possible extra dividend still consequence from repurchase 
is that stock's value and shareholder's voting right in the company increases. (Brealey & 
Myers 1991: 374-380.)  
 
Repurchases is a very topical issue at the moment especially in Finland because more 
and more companies have started to use repurchases as an alternative way to share 
profits. Also the law regarding share repurchases changed recently. Finnish government 
proposed in the year 2005 that companies should be able to buy back 10 % of their 
shares outstanding instead of the former 5 % (Government proposal 109/2005). This 
Act was accepted in July 2006 at the same time as the whole Companies Act was 
renewed. This renewal is line with other EU countries where 10 % is considered as the 
standard amount how much companies can buy back its shares. Idea behind this Act 
was to keep Finland up to date with international standards and to keep Finnish 
companies competitive against foreign companies. For example to Nokia this is very 
important as large part of its owners are foreign based and therefore it's very important 
that it has the same opportunities for profit sharing as for example American companies 
have. Nokia recently announced that it’s going to continue share repurchases as the 
board applied for authorization of buying back 380 million of its own shares, which is 
in total the maximum amount of 10% of the shares outstanding (Nokia 2007). In 
addition now that the imputation system of corporation tax has been removed, profit 
sharing through share repurchases is becoming more attractive opportunity for Finnish 
companies as well.  
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1.1 Research problems and hypotheses 
 
The objective of this research is to examine whether companies experience abnormal 
returns at the presence of share buyback announcements. This thesis’s research problem 
will be examined from two different angles and totally there will be three different 
research questions. At first it will be investigated how stock price behaves around the 
days surrounding stock repurchase announcements. Also it will be investigated whether 
share performance of companies making these announcement have been negative prior 
the announcement. In other words plan is to investigate whether the signalling or 
undervaluation hypothesis holds. Undervaluation hypothesis suggests that companies 
carry out stock repurchases to give signal to the markets that stock is undervalued at the 
moment. Also it will be examined how companies making buybacks perform compared 
to its’ rivals. It will be interesting to see whether repurchase announcement have 
contagion or competitive effect on company’s rivals. Finally comparison between 
companies from different industries will be made, in order to see if share repurchasing 
companies perform differently in different industries. This comparison between 
different industries will not be included as one of the research questions because do to 
the lack of data results wouldn’t be reliable. Hypotheses for this study will be presented 
next among with the contributions they will bring to this are of research.  
 
H1. Companies making share repurchases experience positive abnormal returns in the 
days surrounding the announcement. 
 
Plan is to investigate if companies making share repurchases experience abnormal 
returns at the event window of two days before and two days after the repurchase 
announcement. Many studies which have investigated this problem previously such as 
Comment and Jarrell (1991), Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995), (2000), and 
Liano, Huang and Manakyan (2003) have discovered approximately three percent 
abnormal returns around the five-day event period around repurchase announcement. 
These results have been observed from the Canadian and the United States markets. On 
the other hand results from the Finnish markets have mainly studied how markets react 
around the days when the board announces of its repurchase authorization application. 
For example, Karhunen (2000) and Ihantola (2003) studied market reaction around the 
authorization application for share repurchases and they observed little less than three 
percent abnormal returns around the event period. So the contribution of this study 
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compared to earlier researches in Finland will come from the fact that the actual 
announcement day will be used as the event. Though Hyypiä (2005) and Karhunen 
(2002) researched in their study market reactions around the actual announcement day, 
but still their findings reached only to year 2002, while this thesis provides new results 
with improved data and three additional years.  
 
H2. Companies experience negative abnormal returns prior to the repurchase 
announcement. 
 
Point is to find out how share price behaves from 20 to 3 days before the repurchase 
announcement. Theory behind this hypothesis is that before the positive market reaction 
which comes from the repurchase announcement, share has had negative price 
performance. This means that managers try to time the repurchase announcement or the 
actual repurchase to a time when share price has had a negative price performance for a 
while. With repurchase announcement or with actual buybacks managers try to change 
the course of share price movement and also give signal to the markets that share price 
is undervalued at the moment. Studies made from the United States for example 
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Liano et.al. (2003) have observed statistically 
significant negative share price performance prior the repurchase announcement. From 
the Finnish markets Tomperi (2004) studied managerial timing ability for actual share 
repurchases in his dissertation. He used actual repurchases as an event and his founding 
indicated that managers are interested in supporting their share price during periods of 
major changes in market valuations. This thesis will use different approach than 
Tomperi (2004) by examining whether there are negative abnormal returns in the case 
of buyback announcement like it has been observed in the United States. 
 
H3. Share repurchasing company’s industry peers also experience positive abnormal 
returns in the days surrounding the repurchase announcement.  
 
Third research question of this paper is similar as the first one, but it is done from a 
different angle. Interesting change to first hypothesis will be to study how companies’ 
making share buyback announcements perform against their industry peers or how the 
generally observed positive market reaction for announcing firms affects its industry 
peers. This kind of research problem has not been studied that much internationally and 
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it has not been studied at all in the Finnish markets. So it’ll bring some new contribution 
to the scientific conversation surrounding share buybacks. International studies for this 
intra-industry comparison have so far been a bit mixed. Main objective is to find out 
whether the repurchase announcement has a contagion or a competitive effect on rival 
firms’ share price. Earlier studies on this matter are inconclusive as the results have 
been mixed. While some studies e.g. Erwin and Miller (1998) find that around the 
announcement of share buybacks competitive effect dominates rival firms, other studies 
like the one from Taiwan made by Chang Shao-Chi, Lai Jung-Ho and Yu Chen-Hsiang 
(2005) indicate that rival firms experience contagion effect. Also share repurchase 
announcement can contain mainly firm-specific information like Hertzel (1991) 
observed. Results from the Finnish markets on this matter will be unique and therefore 
interesting to examine. Object is to find out if there are any significant differences 
between stock repurchasing firms' performance compared to same industry's rivals.  
 
Finally, a comparison between different industries will be made in order to see if there 
are any differences on how share repurchasing firms perform when compared industry 
by industry. There can be some industry specific factors and also there may be some 
regulatory differences between industries that may influence the way that repurchasing 
firms perform inside different industries. Liano et.al. (2003) argue in their research that 
inter-industry comparison of open market common stock repurchases is a relevant factor 
when investigated share buybacks. Justification for this argument is that each industry 
has a unique beta and hence unique cost of capital. Therefore the benefit of stock 
buybacks may vary from industry to industry. Management always has to compare the 
benefit of buying back shares to the cost of equity and as different industries have 
different betas therefore the cost of equity changes from industry to industry.  
 
1.2 Earlier research 
 
This area has been studied a lot especially in the United States where stock buybacks 
have been a common way to share profits for a long time. There have been several 
studies on how share prices perform around the announcement of buybacks. So far 
results have been consistent. These results have usually indicated that companies 
making share repurchases experience positive abnormal returns after the announcement 
of buybacks. Some studies have investigated how share prices react to actual buybacks 
but this thesis will focus on abnormal returns around the repurchase announcement. 
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Theo Vermaelen’s publication from the year 1981 was one of the first studies that 
handled this area of research. He examined share price behaviour around share buyback 
announcements and came to conclusion that repurchase announcements are surrounded 
by positive abnormal returns. Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) examined the returns of 
open market share repurchases from US data with a time period of 1980-1990. Results 
indicated 3,42 % abnormal return around the announcement of share buybacks. It’s 
consistent with Vermaelen’s (1981) earlier research which indicated the same kind of 
results on the behalf of open market share repurchase announcement, time period being 
of course 10 years earlier. Liano, Huang & Manakyan (2003) noted in their studies 
approximately 3% excess return over the five-day event window. In this study event 
will be the day when company publicly informs that they are going to use shareholders 
meeting approval and actually start buying back their own shares. Though the market 
reactions for repurchase announcements have mainly been studied from the United 
States markets, still there are some international results as well. Studies from Asian 
markets support the positive market reaction what is observed around repurchase 
announcement in the United States as well. Chang et.al. (2005) findings from Taiwan, 
as well as Park and Jung (2005) findings from Korea are in line with the results 
observed from the United States.  
 
Results from the Finnish markets have been somewhat similar compared to ones in the 
USA. Though studies concerning buybacks have been quite modest due to the short 
lifespan of share repurchases in Finland. Karhunen (2000) observed positive abnormal 
returns of 2.70% for the days surrounding the announcement, where authorization 
application was used as the event. Ihantola (2003) findings were almost identical as he 
observed 2.73% abnormal returns for time period of two days before and two days after 
the announcement. Hyypiä (2005) had data from years 1998 to 2002 and he found 
1.79% cumulative abnormal returns for the five-day event window.  
 
Results for the actual announcements with same five-day event window have been 
observed by Hyypiä (2005) and Karhunen (2002) with abnormal returns of 1.22% and 
0.56% respectively, though both of those results were statistically weak. These 
previously observed statistically weak results for the five-day event window makes it 
interesting that both of these studies found statistically very strong abnormal returns of 
approximately 1% for the event day solely. This would indicate that market reaction 
from the actual announcement is very quick as positive market reaction is included to 
the share price on a same day. 
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Previous studies which have examined the signalling hypothesis have found proof that 
share price performance prior to the announcement day has been noticed to be negative. 
Comment et.al. (1991) suggested that signalling theory was one explanation for share 
repurchases and they also found empirical support for that. They examined this 
hypothesis for various forms of stock repurchases and results were similar for all each 
form and for fixed price offers results were the strongest in the case of negative price 
performance prior the announcement. Liano et.al. (2003) observed approximately -3% 
cumulative abnormal returns for twenty to three days before the announcement. Park 
et.al. (2005) findings from Korean market noted about 6% negative abnormal returns for 
two months before the announcement of share repurchases. Stephen et.al (1998) found 
evidence in the case of actual share repurchases that there is a negative correlation 
between actual share repurchase and share’s preceding performance. Tomperi (2004) 
found similar results from the Finnish markets, which indicated that managers try to 
time the actual repurchases to a place when share is undervalued. This hypothesis is 
actually quite easy to study in Finland compared to how it is in the United States, 
because do to the strict legislation in Finland companies has to make a public 
announcement every time they’ll make repurchases. Undervaluation hypothesis will be 
discussed with more detail in chapter 3.2. 
 
Overall when company announces about increases in corporate payouts that usually 
means increases in share price performance. Whether it is question of raising dividends 
or making share repurchases, markets tend to interpret these events as a positive signal 
about company’s earnings prospects. Depending upon the reason for company’s 
improved earnings prospects, corporate payouts may affect the valuation of competing 
firms in the same industry. For example firm’s enhanced earnings potential may reflect 
positive signal for the whole industry and therefore positive announcement effect is 
contagious within an industry. On the other hand if company’s announcements reflect 
improvement in its competitive position compared to its rivals, then the payout 
announcement could have negative effect on rival firms (i.e. competitive effect). Also 
payout announcements may reflect only company-specific information and therefore it 
has no effect on rival firms.  
 
Chang et.al. (2005) brings some contribution to this area of research from international 
markets, as they studied the intra-industry effect of share repurchase announcements 
from Taiwan. They suggested that the environment in Taiwan’s market is unique in a 
way that buybacks are primarily motivated by market undervaluation. Their findings 
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from Taiwan markets were that both the announcing and rival firms experience 
significant market undervaluation before the announcements of share repurchases. They 
also found that both of these groups received significant wealth gains upon the 
repurchase announcements, which indicates that contagion effect dominates the 
competitive effect. 
 
Hertzel (1991) studied how share repurchase announcements of tender offers affected 
rival firms share prices. He found no strong evidence for contagious or competitive 
effect. Though over longer intervals surrounding the announcement period he found 
some weak evidence for negative rival stock price performance, but overall his 
conclusions were that the information in share repurchase announcements is mainly 
firm-specific.  
 
Erwin et.al. (1998) found in their study that open market share repurchases had 
competitive effect on rival firms. While share repurchasing firms experienced 
statistically significant positive stock price reaction of 3.35 % percent, rival firms in the 
same industry was associated with -0.25 % significant negative stock price reaction. 
Results indicated that good news for repurchasing firms was at the expense of its rivals. 
They also noticed in their study that even though most of the share repurchasing firm’s 
rivals was associated with competitive effect. Still in quite many industries contagion 
effect was observed. Their findings suggested that whether rival firms experience 
competitive or contagious effect was depended on the industry characteristics. For 
instance, industries with low level of competition and cash-flow characteristics differing 
substantially from those of the repurchasing firms experienced significant competitive 
effect of -0.42 percent. On the other hand in the industries where competition level was 
high and cash-flow characteristics quite similar to those of the repurchasing firms 
experienced a small contagion effect of 0.09 %.    
 
Liano et.al. (2003) short-term results were similar with Ikenberry et.al (1996) as 
companies experienced positive abnormal returns of approximately 3 percent around 
repurchase announcements. When comparing how buybacks making companies 
performed in different industries they found significant differences. For example In the 
five-day event window construction & contracting companies experienced 6.2 % 
abnormal return as food companies experienced only 1.3 % positive abnormal return. 
Their findings also indicated that in the long run share repurchasing companies did not 
outperform their rivals, though there were also significant differences how repurchasing 
companies performed against their industry peers. This would indicate that industry 
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affiliation is important factor when analysing stock buybacks. 
 
Even though the effects of share repurchases have been studied a lot, still the effect 
what repurchases have on rival firms have not been researched that much. Similar 
studies have been done where area of interest have been how some new information for 
example raise of dividends affects its industry rivals. Especially in Finland due to the 
short history what share repurchases have, intra-industry comparison has not been 
researched at all and therefore it will be interesting to see the results. 
 
1.3 Structure of the study 
 
Master's thesis started with an introduction to stock repurchases, where the history and 
the presence state of repurchases was presented. Next the research questions of this 
thesis were presented as well as the results from earlier researches. Second chapter 
focuses on the institutional characteristics of the Finnish markets. Law and regulations 
regarding share repurchases will be presented and one subchapter will explain issues 
around market efficiency as well. Also important issues from companies’ payout 
policies in general will be discussed. Third chapter gives a general view on the factors 
which may have influence why corporations begin share repurchase programs. Previous 
studies have concluded many different motives which drives companies to start 
repurchases and the most common reasons will be introduced. Fourth chapter begins 
with a description of data. Clarification will be given about the reasons why this data 
was chosen and what were the reasons why some samples were cut off from the data. 
Event study will be used as the research method and it will be presented with more 
detail in chapter four. In chapter five the empirical results will be presented and 
interpreted, in order to see whether the hypothesis proposed in the first chapter holds or 
not. Final chapter will consists of conclusions about the whole thesis and further 
recommendations will be presented as well. 
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2. ISSUES RELATED TO PAYOUT POLICY AND 
CHARACTERISTICS OF FINNISH MARKETS 
 
Every company’s aim is to make profitable business. After profit has been made 
company have to make decisions how to share its’ profits to shareholders. Shareholders 
who have invested money to company will want to get some compensation for their 
investment in order to be willing to invest their money to that specific company in the 
future as well. Therefore management have to figure out the best possible way to share 
company’s profits back to its shareholders. There are many things which management 
has to think about when deciding what to do with company’s profits. Simply one could 
say that companies’ choices are basically narrowed to two options: dividend payments 
and share repurchases. Third option would be to allocate excess cash to some profitable 
investment that company has in mind. Reasons why companies decide to use certain 
form of profit sharing will be discussed next. 
  
2.1 Payout policy 
 
This payout policy dilemma has pondered researchers for many decades now. Besides 
the numerous studies investigating companies’ payout policy, still there doesn’t exist 
any standard reasons why management makes certain decisions regarding payout 
policy. All the way to the mid 1980’s dividends were by far the most popular method to 
share profits. Nowadays share repurchases and dividends are almost equal ways to share 
profits, especially in the United States. Finnish markets posses so short history on share 
repurchases that in Finland dividends are considered to be still the most important way 
to share profits. Nowadays question is basically whether to use dividends or repurchases 
for profit sharing and how large proportion of the profits should be paid back to 
shareholders. There are basically three different groups with each possessing slightly 
different point of view on how payout policy affects share price. One group of 
researchers believe that by raising dividends it will follow with an increase in firm 
value. Another point of view is that higher dividend payout actually reduces the value of 
a company. Final group follows up the famous study by Miller & Modigliani (1961) 
which indicates that in a world with no transaction costs, taxes or other market 
imperfections dividend policy (i.e. payout policy) doesn’t affect firm’s value.  
 
Payout policy is one of the most important decisions that companies make not only 
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because of the amount of money involved and the long term effects these decisions 
might have but also because it is closely related to most of the financial decisions that 
companies make. Management and the board of directors have to make decisions on the 
level of dividend payments, amount of shares to be repurchased, investments in real 
assets, mergers and acquisitions, and debt issuance. All of these decisions have an effect 
to each other, because theories from capital structure, mergers and acquisitions, asset 
pricing, and capital budgeting all are dependent on the view how and why firms pay out 
cash. These six empirical observations play an important role in the discussions of 
payout policies. (Allen & Michaely 2002.) 
 
1.  Large, established corporations typically pay out a significant percentage 
of their earnings in the form of dividends and repurchases. 
 
2.  Historically, dividends have been the predominant form of payout. Share 
repurchases were relatively unimportant until the mid 1980’s, but since 
then have become an important form of payment.  
 
3.  Among firms traded on organized exchanges in the U.S., the proportion of 
dividend-paying firms has been steadily declining. Since the beginning of 
the 1980’s, most firms have initiated their cash payment to shareholders in 
the form of repurchases rather than dividends. 
 
4. Individuals in high tax brackets receive large amounts in cash dividends 
and pay substantial amounts of taxes on these dividends. 
 
5. Corporations smooth dividends relative to earnings. Repurchases are more 
volatile than dividends. 
 
6. The market reacts positively to announcements of repurchase and dividend 
increases, and negatively to announcements of dividend decreases. 
 
2.1.1. Role of dividends in payout policy 
 
Lintner (1956) was one of the first researchers to address this problematic from 
dividend point of view solely and his research reviled few findings which influenced 
corporate management on how to do dividend payments. Firms tend to use dividend 
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payout ratios which are designated for a long run. Also mature and stable companies 
pay out high proportion of earnings compared to growth companies whose dividend 
payouts are very low and sometimes there weren’t any dividend payments at all. 
Lintner’s findings also suggested that managers goal is to keep dividends at the same 
level rather than changing dividend ratio on a yearly basis and if dividends are to be 
raised it is done steadily over time. Support for Lintner’s (1956) results was provided by 
Brav, Graham, Campbell and Michaely (2004) as they interviewed 384 financial 
executives in order to determine the factors that drive dividend and share repurchase 
decisions. Interviews resulted that management are very reluctant to cut down dividend-
levels and that dividends increases are tied to long-run sustainable earnings but not so 
much as in the past. 
 
Markets usually react positively to dividend raises and dividend cut off results in a fall 
in price. But overall when it comes to the level of dividends, investors do not tend to 
care so much about that, what they do care about is the change of dividends and that is 
something that worries them. Unexpected changes in dividends might cause stock price 
to bounce back and forth as investors are wondering the significance of the change. 
(Brealy, Myers & Allen 2006: 420.)  
 
Allen et.al. (2002) gave few suggestions based on their empirical studies, what 
companies might to think about when deciding on dividend policy. First, firms that have 
high degree of information asymmetry and large growth opportunities should avoid 
paying dividends. Meaning that times when company faces many good investment 
opportunities, reduction on dividends might become profitable in the long run. Second, 
when firms interact with bondholders, the use of dividends to extract wealth from 
bondholders should be avoided as in the long run results might be harmful to equity 
holders. Third, annually paid dividends would be more reasonable solution than 
quarterly paid dividends. Longer intervals between payments would allow investors that 
are interested in long-term capital gains to sell the stock before dividends are paid and 
therefore avoid the taxation of dividends payments. Also if someone is interested in 
dividend income, annually paid dividends would minimize their transaction costs. 
Finally company paying dividends would save administrative and mailing costs by 
choosing to pay dividends on a yearly basis. 
  
Basically the amount of profit company makes defines how much it can share dividends 
and how high its share will be valued in the markets. Also when analyzing company’s 
possibilities and future, one has to think about many different things. Common things 
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investor needs to think are the general situation in the world, overall situation in the 
industry where company is functioning as well as the company specific factors.   
 
2.1.2. Role of share repurchase in payout policy 
 
Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) investigated why some companies tend to 
use repurchases as a method for profit sharing and why some companies preferred 
dividends. They found out that dividends were paid by firms with high “permanent” 
operating cash flow while repurchases were used if company had higher “temporary”, 
non-operating cash flow. Also share repurchasing firms had more volatile cash flows 
and distributions. This would support Lintner’s (1956) findings that companies want to 
keep their dividends at the same level. As companies are willing to keep the dividend 
level constant, the residual cash flow after investments are therefore used for share 
repurchases. Nowadays repurchases are also favoured by management because they are 
viewed being more flexible than dividends and repurchases can also be timed to a place 
what is the most suitable for the company.  
 
Share repurchase differ from dividend payments in a way that former is often 
considered as a one-off event. Meaning that companies making share repurchase 
announcements are not making a long-term commitment to earn and distribute more 
cash. Therefore the information in share repurchase announcements and the information 
in a dividend payment is slightly different. Companies buy back their shares usually 
because they have accumulated more cash than they can profitably invest or when they 
wish to increase their debt levels. Neither of this news contains anything special to 
shareholders itself but usually investors are relieved to hear that companies are paying 
out the excess cash rather than spending it on unprofitable investments. (Brealy et.al. 
2006: 420.) 
 
Allen et.al. (2002) suggested in their study that companies should follow the example of 
the last decade and use repurchases more often than they have been doing so far. Their 
conclusion also was that investment and repurchase policies should be coordinated to 
avoid the transaction costs of financing. In addition whenever positive NPV (net present 
value) investments are available repurchases should be avoided and on the contrary 
when positive NPV investment opportunities do not exist unneeded cash should be paid 
out by repurchasing shares. 
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2.1.3. Choice between dividends and repurchases 
 
If the choice between repurchases and dividend payments is related to the amount that 
can be distributed then there are basically three different categories. The smallest 
distribution is usually done via dividends alone, while tender offer premiums will 
dominate for very large distributions. Finally if distributed profit is in an intermediate 
level then open market share repurchases are favoured. Shareholders with sufficiently 
low ownership on holdings and whose tax rate on dividends is not too high will prefer 
dividends, whereas those with sufficiently high ownership will prefer repurchases. 
(Brennan & Thakor 1990.) 
 
In practice companies just have to think about what decision in payout policy will 
increase shareholder’s value at the most. There are many variables which managers 
need to think about before making decisions on payout policy. For example structure of 
the shareholders is something that needs to be taken into consideration. In Finland 
Liljeblom & Pasternack (2002) found out in their research that foreign ownership was a 
relevant factor why Finnish companies did share repurchases, and that was because 
dividends and capital gains are taxed differently in different countries. There might be 
many other reasons why companies make repurchases and those motives will be 
addressed later on in chapter 3. Overall dividends are considered to be more stable and 
it is preferred to keep the payout ratio at the same level throughout time. At the same 
time share repurchases are considered to be more unstable in a way that shareholders do 
not expect repurchases to happen in a same stable manner as dividend payments. 
Factors that affect payout decisions depend on the characteristics of the company in 
hand as well as the characteristics of the shareholders. 
 
Table 1 illustrates what has been the relation between share repurchases and dividends 
for the main list companies in Helsinki Stock Exchange through years 2002 to 2006.  It 
shows how the amount of dividends have increased steadily and also how suddenly 
amount of share repurchases decreased between the years 2005 to 2006. Sudden drop of 
repurchases is considered to be quite strange because generally it is thought that the 
increased taxation for dividends would result as an increase in share repurchase 
programs. One explanation could be that markets did generally quite well in the year 
2006 as Helsinki OMX Capped –index rose up approximately one quarter and therefore 
companies weren’t that eager to buy back its own shares (Taloussanomat 2007: 24.) 
 
Overall the trend in Finland has been that companies have favoured dividend payments 
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over repurchases. In the past this was the case mainly because the imputation system of 
corporate tax meant that Finnish shareholders did not have to pay any taxes from 
dividends, and nowadays the effective taxation is still lower for dividends as it is for 
capital gains. So therefore dividends are more preferred way to share profits, especially 
if majority of shareholders are Finnish. 
 
 
Table 1. Relation between dividend payments and share repurchases in Finland. 
(Taloussanomat 2007: 24). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Market efficiency 
 
Market efficiency is one of the key assumptions to recognize when examining market 
behaviour. According to market efficiency share prices reflect the information which is 
available for every market participant and investor (Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2002:342). 
Therefore market efficiency could be described as information efficiency as well. 
Markets is said to be efficient when the change of a share price is quick and correct 
whenever some new information arises. This is an area of interest which has been 
studied a lot. Studies have examined how fast and how well the new information is 
actually reflected into share prices. Efficient market hypothesis contains three main 
assumptions: 
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1. Markets have large amount of independent participants who are concerned with the 
analysis and valuation of securities and their main goal is to maximize their profit. 
 
2. New information about securities arrives in a random fashion. 
 
3. When new information comes along, it is rapidly reflected into the share prices. 
While the price adjustments are not always perfect still it happens in an unbiased way. 
(Buckley 1986:90.)  
 
Classically market efficiency has been divided into three different categories: weak 
form of efficiency, semi-strong form of efficiency and strong form of efficiency. 
Differences between these form of efficiencies is defined how well they reflect the 
available information. At the weak form of efficiency share prices reflect all the 
information what is in the past. If markets are efficient in the weak sense, then it is 
impossible to make consistently superior profits by studying past returns. When markets 
are associated with semi-strong form of efficiency then prices will reflect addition to 
past prices also all the information what is publicly available. Prices will also adjust 
immediately to public information such as a new issue of stock, earnings announcement 
and so on. At the level of strong form of efficiency besides the publicly available 
information also the private information is contained into share prices. At this form of 
efficiency there wouldn’t be any investment managers who could consistently beat the 
markets. (Brealy, Myers & Allen 2006: 337.) 
   
2.3 Legal and tax issues around share repurchases 
 
One thing that affects corporate payout decisions is of course the environment and the 
legislative surroundings it has to operate in. One good example is for instance taxation. 
Management have to take into consideration how different payout methods affect 
shareholders’ taxation. Some investors might prefer capital gains over dividends 
because of the different tax treatment that these forms of profit sharing have. Before 
Finnish markets used to differ a lot from the ones in the USA for example, but 
nowadays legislative characteristics are a bit more close to each other. Nevertheless 
there are still some characteristic differences that need to be presented in order to better 
understand reasons behind repurchases in Finland.  
 
Most of the studies concerning share repurchases are done in the United States. Because 
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of the different nature of these two markets it’s necessary to present how Finnish 
markets are influenced by taxation and legislation. There have been and there still are 
few special characteristics in the Finnish markets that need to be point out. Before the 
beginning of the year 2005 biggest difference between Finnish markets and most of the 
other markets in the world was the imputation system of corporation tax. It prevented 
the double taxation of dividends as shareholders did not have to pay any tax for the 
dividends they received. This system was removed mainly because other countries in 
EU did not have this kind of system and therefore authorities wanted to bring Finnish 
legislation closer to EU standards. Now that it has been removed, Finnish markets are 
more similar with the ones in Europe and the United States. Other major difference 
between Finland and EU has been the percentage of shares companies can buy back 
from the markets. Before July 2006 Finnish companies were restricted to buy back only 
5 % of the shares outstanding, but because of the renewal of Companies Act 
(21.7.2006/624) the amount of buybacks allowed has changed. This change is more in 
line with EU standards as companies can now buyback 10 % of its own shares 
outstanding compared to the 5 % it was before. As Companies Act was renewed 
recently it also brought some other changes to share repurchases as well. Next the 
legislation and taxation concerning share repurchases will be presented as it is in its’ 
new form. Because this thesis’ empirical part uses data before recent renewal of 
Companies Act, significant changes between old and new Act will be presented as well.  
 
2.3.1 Legislation about share repurchases 
 
Buying back shares is just another way for companies to share profits. Most of the 
legislation surrounding share repurchases comes from Companies Act, Securities Act 
and the rules and regulations of OMX. Legislation around share buybacks is pretty strict 
in Finland compared to one in the USA. In Finland companies have to make a public 
announcement about pretty much everything concerning share repurchases. Starting 
from the beginning when companies make the authorization application to the time 
when actual repurchases occur, all these events need to be publicly announced. For 
example actual share repurchases have to be publicly announced and this is opposite to 
the practice in the United States. That partially makes it difficult to investigate how 
markets react to actual buybacks in the USA and therefore there are not that many 
studies in the USA that would focus on the abnormal reactions around the actual share 
buybacks.  
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Before companies can start their share repurchase programs they need to get an 
authorization. First board makes a proposal to the shareholders’ meeting that company 
should start buying back its own shares. This application has to be publicly announced 
and usually it’s done at the same time as board’s other proposals for shareholders’ 
meeting. Board’s proposal and shareholders’ decision about buybacks have to include 
certain issues: 
 
1. Amount of shares intended to be repurchased in a sub-share level. 
2. From where and from whom shares are to be repurchased, and also in which 
order shares are to be repurchased. 
3. Time period when repurchases can be made. 
4. Compensation given for shares repurchased or how the compensation is 
evaluated.  
5. How this procedure affects company’s capital. (Companies Act 15:7§.) 
 
When 2/3 of the stakeholders have accepted board’s proposal, then company is able to 
use the authorization whenever they wish, though it has to be used within 18 months 
from the initiation of the program, this rule has changed a bit as before repurchases were 
valid for 12 months. This legislative feature differs from the one in the USA as there is 
no ‘deadline’ when announced repurchases have to be made. Stephens and Weisbach 
(1998) points out in their study that it is not unusual for U.S. companies that repurchase 
programs go on for several years. The public announcement for using shareholders’ 
authorization has to be made one week before actual acquisitions start. This makes sure 
that company cannot make repurchases just from certain shareholders. Share buybacks 
also have to be made in a way that company does not try to affect share’s performance 
too much. This means that company can only repurchase certain amount of shares each 
day. That amount is restricted to 50% of the average daily trades made in past four 
weeks before the actual repurchase. (Companies Act 21.7.2006/624). 
 
In addition to Companies Act, OMX has its own rules and regulations regarding share 
repurchases. Share repurchases must be carried out in a way that actual buybacks aren’t 
too large compared to the general level to what share is usually traded. The public 
notices which have to be made from actual repurchase must also contain certain 
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features: (OMX 2007.) 
 
- Name of the company 
- Date of repurchase 
- Share’s gender, for example is it A- or B-share 
- Number of shares 
- Unit  price, usually average price, the highest and lowest price needs to 
be announced 
- Total price  
- Date of the announcement 
- Signature 
 
Possibility for insider trading is also something that has to be taken into consideration in 
the share repurchase process. General laws concerning insider trading applies to share 
repurchases as well. Meaning that person or company is breaking the law if it takes 
advantage of the insider information in order to achieve financial benefit to itself or to 
somebody else. To avoid situations where company could be interpreted taking 
advantage of the insider information illegally it’s good to follow certain principles when 
carrying out share repurchases. It is recommended that repurchases won’t be executed 
in 14 days preceding any financial statements. All the necessary information from 
repurchases are documented and sent to all the necessary authorities. If changes are 
made to original repurchase mandate then it should be handled as a new repurchase 
mandate and it should follow same procedure as repurchases do in the beginning of 
their issuance. (OMX-Group 2007.) 
 
2.3.2 Tax issues around share buybacks 
 
Taxation for capital gains and dividends changed quite much at the beginning of year 
2005. Biggest change was the removal of imputation system of corporation tax like it 
was mentioned earlier. Law has changed in a way that nowadays tax rate for capital 
gains is 28 % and for corporate tax it is 26%. Though dividends received from publicly 
listed company are partially still tax-free. 30% of the dividends what shareholders 
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receive are tax-free and the rest of the 70% are taxed with 28% tax rate (Valli 2004). 
This means that company’s shared profit is double taxed as first company has to pay 
26% tax for its profits and after that shareholder still pays tax for his capital gains. 
Overall taxation in Finland is harder for capital gains than what it is for dividends, as 
the effective taxation is 28% and 19,6% respectively. 
 
Specific issue surrounding taxation of share repurchases comes from drawing the line 
between share repurchase and hidden distribution of dividends. VML 18.12.1995/1558 
is a law about taxation in Finland and according to that if share repurchases are made in 
order to avoid taxation of dividends then those shared profits must be taxed at a same 
way as normal dividend payments would be. Due to the strict legislation around share 
repurchases, in Finland hidden distribution of dividends via buybacks is quite hard to 
make.  
 
One change that was made in Finnish legislation could also have some affect how 
popular repurchases will become in the future. According to the new deal made between 
Finland and the United States dividends received by American pension companies will 
no longer be taxed with 15% source tax. Affects of this change can be seen for example 
in Nokia, which increased the amount of dividends from last year and applied 
repurchase authorizations for smaller amounts. (Taloussanomat 2007: 24.) 
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3. SHARE REPURCHASES IN PRACTICE AND MOTIVES 
BEHIND IT 
 
As it was mentioned earlier if we ignore taxation and transaction costs it is irrelevant to 
shareholder whether excess cash is allocated to him via dividends or via share 
repurchases. For example if company’s value is 100 euros and it has 10 shares. First, in 
the case of dividend payments, if company’s dividend payments are in total 10 euros, 
that means 1 euro dividend payment for each share. This means that after dividend 
payments, company’s value diminishes to 90 euros, shareholder receives 1 euro worth 
of dividends and he is holding a share worth of 9 euros, which is in total of 10 euros. 
Second, in the case of share repurchases, company buys back its’ own shares worth of 
ten euros which means that company can buy back one share. Again value of the 
company diminishes to 90 but now share price still remains as ten euros because shares 
outstanding have reduced to nine. This results that shareholder wealth stays the same in 
both of these cases, and this example is illustrated in table 2. (Brealy et.al. 2003: 442-
446.) 
 
 
Table 2. Example of the theoretical irrelevance between dividends and repurchases. 
  Dividend Payment   Share Repurchase 
Company's Value 100 € Company's Value 100 € 
number of shares 10 number of shares 10 
Value of a share 10€/share Value of a share 10€/share 
Shareholder's wealth 10 € Shareholder's wealth 10 € 
        
Dividend payments 10 € Share repurchase 10 € 
Company's Value 100 € Company's Value 100 € 
  -10 €   -10 € 
  90 €   90 € 
number of shares 10 number of shares 9 
Value of a share 9€/share Value of a share 10 € 
Cash 1 €     
Shareholder's wealth 10 € Shareholder's wealth 10 € 
 
 
In the real world it is not that simple and there can be many factors which management 
have to take into consideration before deciding which way to share company’s profits. 
Good example for instance is taxation, because taxation for dividends and taxation for 
capital gains can be different. Therefore management motives for repurchases can 
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sometimes be avoiding taxation. 
 
As all the decisions that management makes are all aimed that share price would 
increase and that the value of the company would rise. Share repurchases final motive is 
of course the one mentioned earlier. But if you look at more specifically what the 
motives are behind repurchases then you’ll find that there are lot of different motives 
what drives management to share profits through share repurchases. Those motives will 
be examined more closely at the chapters ahead. Lot of studies, which mostly comes 
from the United States, are focused on the reasons why companies make share 
repurchases. The main motives, which always arise in scientific discussions, are 
signalling hypothesis, taxation, EPS enhancement, employees’ stock options etc. These 
motives will be presented in theory and also one of the research questions of this thesis 
is to examine empirically how the signalling or undervaluation hypothesis holds in the 
Finnish markets.  
 
Picture one describes announced motives behind share repurchase in Finland from years 
1998 to 2001 (Karhunen 2002: 24). Acquisition was mentioned as the number one 
reason why companies’ start repurchases. Idea behind that is to use corporation’s own 
shares as a medium of exchange when making acquisitions. Management often justify 
this procedure by saying that it’s a handy way to make acquisitions as companies don’t 
have to issue more shares if possible merger comes into reality.  
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Figure 1. Announced reasons for repurchase programs. (Karhunen 2002: 24). 
 
 
In the United States emphasis around the motives for share repurchases are a bit 
different compared to the ones in Finland. This is because repurchases have been only a 
while a common way of sharing profits here in Finland and also the taxation for buying 
back shares has been different throughout the time in these two countries. In the United 
States you don’t have to announce any reasons for buybacks and therefore there is not 
same kind of statistics about the reasons as there are in Finland. In the scientific 
literature which is found from the United States there is often mentioned that enhancing 
the capital structure would be the most common reason for share repurchases. Also 
many companies mention they will use share repurchases for covering employee’s stock 
options. However undervaluation of current share price and excess cash was not 
mentioned so often as a reason for share buybacks. (Wansley, Lane & Sarkar 1990). 
 
3.1 Practical methods for share repurchases 
 
Open market share repurchases are by far the most popular method to execute share 
repurchases and this research will investigate the effects of open market share 
repurchases. Still there are few other ways company can buy back its shares from the 
markets and it is necessary to present these other methods as well. There are basically 
three different ways to carry out repurchases, which are open market share repurchases, 
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tender offers, and private negotiations. In open market share repurchases companies’ 
buy back its own shares directly from stock exchanges. In Finland this is practically the 
only way share repurchases are made and also in the United States this method is by far 
the most common way to execute buybacks.  
 
For tender offers there are two different formations: fixed price tender offer and Dutch 
auction. In fixed price tender offers company commits itself for buying back stocks 
from shareholders to a fixed price for a certain period of time. Price of the share that 
companies are willing to repurchase in these fixed tender offers is usually a bit above 
the price that shares have on the markets. This is usually a very ‘fair’ offer for 
shareholders and therefore the probability that company is able to buy back its shares 
increases. Another formation of tender offer is Dutch Auction. It differs from fixed 
price tender offer in a way that the price what company is willing to pay for its shares is 
not fixed but instead it is set between a certain range of share prices. This gives 
companies possibilities and it removes the risk that company would pay more than the 
price that shareholders are willing to sell. (Stern & Chew 1998: 132–136). Advantage of 
this method is also that it reduces the number of shareholders who are willing to sell 
their share for too small price and therefore the price for possible takeover rises. Usage 
of the Dutch Auction method has increased in recent times.  
 
Third choice for management to execute repurchases is private negotiations. This is 
usually done so that offer for share buybacks is made to certain group or to certain 
shareholder who owns considerable amount of company’s shares. For example if some 
investment group has acquired itself large amount of company’s shares in order to 
eventually get the majority of shares for the company. In this kind of situation company 
can make an offer of its shares to this investment group who tries to make a takeover 
and through this get rid off the takeover attempt. This kind of takeover attempt is called 
greenmail, in that kind of situation firm has to make extremely fair offer so that it could 
acquire back its own shares. After share repurchases have been done in any of these 
three cases mentioned, then company is left with the decision what to do with the shares 
acquired. Options are to annul those shares or keep them in the treasury for possible 
reissuing. Quite often latter option is the most common and reasonable solution. 
(Brealey ym. 1991: 374.) 
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3.2 Undervaluation hypothesis 
 
Theoretically very common reason for share buybacks is that stock price at the moment 
is undervalued. Idea behind this theory is that management starts buying back its own 
shares when they feel that stock is being undervalued. Through buybacks management 
wants to give a signal to the markets that share price is undervalued at the moment and 
therefore a good investment. Management believes that share price is not at the level as 
it should be and therefore company itself wants to investment to its’ own shares. It is 
observed in a questionnaire made to corporate executives that companies indeed wants 
to give positive signal to the markets about company’s share price. (Wansley, Lane & 
Sarkar 1990).  
 
Undervaluation hypothesis is also based on an assumption that information asymmetry 
between insiders and shareholders may cause the share price to be undervalued. As 
repurchases are executed markets tend to interpret this information as a positive signal. 
Logic behind this is that the insiders have more information than normal shareholders 
and if insiders think that buying back its own share is a better use of profits rather than 
for example new investment then the stock must be undervalued. (Dittmar 2000: 334; 
Lee, Mikkelson & Partch 1992.) 
 
In the USA there has been observed negative correlation between the stock prices 
before and after share repurchase announcement. These results implicate that as share 
price decreases below a certain level then management knows that now stock price is 
undervalued and therefore a good investment. (Stephens ja Weisbach 1998). Liano et al. 
(2003) also found support for this undervaluation hypothesis in short-term. When 
examined this hypothesis with a long period of time they did not find any support for 
the signalling hypothesis. Their findings were consistent with Ikenberry et al. 
(1995,2000). Same kinds of results have been observed in Finland as well. If a Finnish 
company has stated undervaluation as a reason for buybacks then the stock price has 
had negative price performance before share repurchase announcement. (Karhunen 
2002).  
 
3.3 Taxation 
 
There are few differences between Finland and the United States when it comes to 
corporate and capital taxation. Biggest difference has been the imputation system of 
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corporate tax. Before year 2005 Finnish shareholders didn’t have to pay any tax for the 
dividends they received from the company. Companies paid tax from the winnings they 
made and the dividends what companies paid to share holders were tax-free. This was 
because in this imputation system government compensated the tax what otherwise 
shareholder would have had to pay. Naturally after this old system was removed there 
have not yet been any researches if this dividend taxation has had any effects on 
companies’ intentions to buyback their own shares. Also it’s good to remember that 
researches of Finnish share repurchase programs have been done at the time when 
imputation system still existed.  
 
One common reason especially in the United States that leads to these share buybacks is 
the different tax treatment that dividends and capital gains have. In the United States 
taxation for dividends is bigger than what tax treatment for profits you get from selling 
a share is. One could think that why not then transfer all the winnings to shareholders by 
share buybacks? Reason why companies don’t make all of its profit distribution via 
buybacks is that local authority monitors that dividend payments won’t be disguised to 
share buybacks. If companies’ repurchase programs are out of proportion or those 
happens regularly then Internal Revenue Service can decide to use same taxation for 
sales profits and dividends. Due to this monitoring companies don’t announce avoiding 
taxation as an official reason for buybacks. For official reason company may say that 
share is a good investment at the moment or that they want to buy back shares in case of 
possible acquisitions. (Brealy & Myers 2004: 440-441.)  
 
Rau & Vermaelen (2002) investigated share repurchases in the United Kingdom and 
especially whether taxation had an effect on the start for repurchase programs. They 
found out that tax system is an important determinant in the choice of payout 
mechanism. Every time tax system changed so that repurchases wasn’t that attempting 
from tax perspective, the amount of repurchase programs diminished. Also their study 
concluded that the tax treatment of important investors, such as pension funds, 
determines the payout policy.  
 
Naturally situation in Finland has been opposite to one in the USA. In Finland taxation 
for dividends has been smaller than taxation for the profits of selling a stock have been, 
as dividend taxation has not existed. Therefore avoiding taxation has not been a reason 
for share repurchases in Finland, unless foreign investors are the vast majority of 
company’s owners. Foreign ownership is an effective reason why companies start share 
buyback programs in Finland and it has been observed that it’s the most important 
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individual reason what differs the companies who does repurchases and who doesn’t. It 
will be interesting to follow how the situation will develop in the future due to the 
changes in taxation. Even though taxation for dividends has tightened in Finland still 
Finnish shareholder doesn’t benefit from share repurchases in the sense of smaller 
taxation as the taxation for capital gains remains higher than dividend taxation. 
(Karhunen 2002; Liljeblom & Pasternack 2002; Kulmala 2005.) 
 
3.4 Earnings per share enhancement 
 
When company buys back its own shares from the markets, number of shares 
outstanding diminishes and in an addition relatively earnings per share increases. This is 
considered to be one motivation why company would want to start repurchase 
programs. This is not usually said to be the main motivation in repurchases but in some 
cases purpose to increase EPS-figure might explain the start of share repurchases.  
 
Reasons why companies would want to influence the EPS-figure can be numerous. One 
reason might be that compensation structure for executives provides incentives to 
manage earnings and EPS. If executives’ bonuses are tied to the EPS-figure then 
management would want to increase earnings per share and that could be done via 
buybacks. Another reason is that EPS-figure is considered to be a key statistic when 
evaluating company’s performance and valuation. EPS can be quite important to many 
different groups such as investors, financial advisors and managers. Firms tend to care 
about what their EPS-figure look like when compared to last year’s benchmark, because 
usually it is considered as a bad signal if earnings per share decrease from last year. 
Also analysts’ expectations for EPS might be something that management are trying to 
aim at when doing repurchases. (Weisbenner 2002.) 
 
Hribar, Jenkins and Johnson (2006) investigated in their study whether companies use 
share repurchases in order to achieve the targeted EPS-figures. They found evidence 
that disproportionately large number of firms have EPS increasing repurchases when 
they would have marginally missed analyst forecasts without repurchases and 
disproportionately small number of firms have EPS decreasing repurchases when they 
were close to analyst forecasts. Another finding from their study was that companies 
who “beat or meet” analysts’ earnings forecasts as a consequence from repurchases 
experience approximately 60% less valuation premium for doing so when compared to 
companies who met or over achieved analysts’ forecasts without a repurchase. This 
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indicated that markets tend to see when EPS-figures are manipulated by share 
repurchases. 
 
3.5 Employee stock options 
 
Lately stock option programs have received lot of publicity in Finland. Reason for this 
is big corporations’ incentives programs, which have given executives noticeable 
rewards through options. For example Fortum Corporation’s Chief Executive Officer 
Mikael Lilius received huge profits from his option programs and his rewards were 
vastly discussed in the Finnish news papers, most people thoughts were that the amount 
of money he received from these option programs were just too much. These 
managements’ option programs may be one reason why companies decide to begin 
share repurchases. As company’s executives posses large amounts of options to 
company’s shares and when it’s quite likely that they’ll use their options. Then 
company can prepare in advance for this situation by buying back shares. This is good 
in a sense that if and when companies’ executives decide to use their options company 
do not have a need for issuing new shares. 
 
One reason why share buybacks have increased massively in the 1990’s is increased 
amount of executives’ and other employees’ stock option programs.  It has been noticed 
that option programs is a good way to reward management and employees for a job well 
done and also at the same time options work as a good incentive for employees to work 
harder. It has been noticed in the United States that when corporations’ have stock 
option programs for their management then it’s usually quite likely that repurchase 
programs will be issued. First of all buying back own shares increases share price and at 
the same time management’s wealth increases as well, because their option programs 
value goes up through increased share prices. Unlike if company would share its profits 
in the form of dividends, because most of the option programs in the United States are 
not dividend protected. (Kahle 2002.) 
 
If company’s employees have large amount of option programs and those are to be 
executed then consequence may be dilution of EPS-figure. This happens if large 
amounts of shares have to be issued because of the option programs. Moreover this 
means that earnings per share diminishes and because EPS is a very important indicator 
to investors companies are eager to prevent EPS from weakening. If option programs 
are directed only to a few people e.g. top management then it has different kind of effect 
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on the start of option programs rather than if option programs include larger part of 
employees. (Weisbenner 2002; Kahle 2002.) 
 
Most of the corporations in the United States do not use dividend protection in their 
option programs, therefore management might be tempted to make share repurchases 
instead of paying dividends. Via repurchases management could add the value of their 
option programs as share price rises. Dividend protection in option programs means that 
paid dividends are connected to option programs and thus risk that management would 
try to affect share price at the cost of dividends is removed. For example in the United 
States it is noticed that management option-programs and company’s practice to raise 
dividends has negative correlation (Brown, Liam & Weisbenner 2004). This is in line 
with the hypothesis that management personal motives due have some affect to 
decisions to start repurchases. In Finland it is noticed that dividend protected option 
programs have positive affect on the practice how companies pay dividends and on the 
contrary non-protected option programs has negative affect to dividend payments. 
Result is that by using dividend-protection in option programs companies can prevent 
situation where management motive to maximize their own wealth would affect 
repurchase decisions. (Liljeblom & Pasternack 2002: 17–18.) 
 
3.6 Optimal capital structure 
 
In the scientific literature change of a capital structure is something that might have 
affect why companies’ start share repurchase programs. Basically it means that 
company reduces its equity and increases its leverage ratio. Company may have a 
certain leverage ratio that it’s aiming at and one way to achieve this specific leverage 
ratio is to buy back own shares. Benefits to companies for changing leverage and 
increasing debt comes from the fact that interest payments on debt are tax deductible. 
This means that the after-tax cost of debt is well below the shareholders’ expected 
return on equity and therefore it reduces company’s average cost of capital. Debt 
finance is handy only in situations where there are taxable profits that deduction of 
interests can be used for and that debt financing will not bring too much risk for the 
company. It is quite likely that company starts repurchase programs if its leverage ratio 
is not at the level it wishes it to be. It was examined in the United States that if 
companies had net leverage ratio lower than what it is targeted then companies’ tend to 
use share repurchases in order to increase leverage. This means that firms’ capital 
structure has affect on its decisions to start repurchases. (Dittmar 2000: 335.) 
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Survey evidence from the United States made by Wansley, Lane and Sarkar (1990) 
illustrated, that firms often (55%) state “improving capital structure as a motive for 
repurchases. Same kind of results has been observed from the Finnish markets as well 
and this can be seen from figure 1. It shows that 54 % of the stated reasons for buybacks 
are related to changing capital structure. Bagwell and Shoven (1988) suggested in their 
study that firms who had quite modest debt ratios made share repurchases in order to 
move towards some higher target level of debt. Also on the contrary, firms that have 
high level of debt might not be so eager to repurchase. Consistent with these 
suggestions, Karhunen (2002) findings from the Finnish markets showed that 
repurchasing companies had relatively low debt ratios and that firms which announced 
their repurchase reason as “alter capital structure” were significantly less levered than 
other repurchasing firms.  
 
3.7 Other motives 
 
In the earlier chapters all the common and most usual motives have been presented and 
this chapter handles a bit more unusual motives, which have not been presented as much 
as those common reasons for share repurchases. Even though these motives can be a bit 
more rare but still its might play a part in company’s decisions to initiate repurchase 
programs. 
 
When a company has Excess cash that gives company an option to pay extra dividends, 
find new investment opportunities or buy back their own shares from the market. This 
free cash flow –hypothesis basically focuses on the agency problem between managers 
and shareholders on the distribution of free cash flows. Park et.al. (2005) suggested that 
stock repurchases avoids making investments in unprofitable projects, thereby resulting 
in significant positive valuation effects. Guffey and Schnider (2004) examined the 
financial characteristics for firms making share repurchases and for companies who 
didn’t make any repurchases. When examining the variables of each company from 
these two different groups they found that free cash flow is the relatively most 
important explanation for share repurchases.  
 
Reason how excess cash has effect on share repurchase decisions is that rather than 
temporarily raising dividends, company wants to share its profits through share 
buybacks. Because in the times when business is not going so well and company should 
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then reduce the raised dividend and that could have bad effect on share price. Therefore 
keeping dividend on a same level is more secure option due to the fact that too large 
fluctuation of dividend causes uncertainty. This making share repurchases better option 
to extra dividends if there aren’t any good investment opportunities available. (Dittmar 
2000: 333-334.) 
 
Excess cash can bring also other kinds of problems such as risk that management will 
invest excess cash to poor investments what will not increase shareholders wealth but 
will benefit management itself. In other words this is as a typical agency problem as 
corporation management and shareholders have conflicting interests. Shareholders want 
to increase the value of their shares and management wants to maximize company’s 
wealth. By maximizing company’s wealth management increases its own influence on 
the company and its possibility to carry out different kinds of investments. Using excess 
cash to buying back its own shares it’s a good way to prevent the situation where 
management would make an investment that didn’t bring any extra value to 
shareholders. (Jensen 1986: 323-324.) 
  
One good thing about buybacks compared to dividends is the flexibility that repurchases 
give. Companies may try to affect share price simply by just announcing that they are 
going to start buying back their own shares. Even though this kind of announcement is 
published, still it does not obligate companies to make actual buybacks. When it comes 
to share repurchases it is good to keep in mind that due to the strict legislation in 
Finland it is harder to achieve same kind of flexibility than it is in the USA. In Finland 
for instance there is a certain time period when companies are able to buyback its own 
shares and that is 18 months starting from the time when repurchase programs were 
accepted in the shareholder meeting. In the United States this is a bit different as the 
actual share repurchases can happen even after few years after the announcement and 
therefore this kind of opportunity gives companies a lot of flexibility for the timing of 
actual buybacks. Reason why companies might wait for few years before carrying out 
actual buybacks is that they are hoping that investors’ trust towards their share would 
rise automatically and share price would increase without having to execute actual 
buybacks. In addition management has time to wait if share price would happen to 
decrease even more and so carry out repurchases in a more appropriate time.  
 
Besides the timing ability flexibility is gained in way that companies can change the 
amount of the shares what they planned to repurchase. Different situations may occur 
and sometimes it might make sense to buy back more or less shares that was originally 
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planned (Stephens & Weisbach 1998: 313-333). One feature which makes repurchases 
more flexible compared to dividends is that repurchases can be done during the whole 
period when authorization is valid. While dividends are paid in one specific occasion, 
share repurchases is a good way to share profits throughout the year and steadily adjust 
the liquidity reserves (Elo 2004: 5).  
 
Own shares can be used in situations where company wants to acquire some other 
company. In addition repurchases can be justified if company fears that it will be a 
target of an acquisition. If a firm is being as a takeover target, then management have to 
act if they want to keep their jobs. In addition to that they have to think about retaining 
the value of company’s share. Therefore if preventing the takeover attempt is not going 
to be too costly management will most likely prevent takeover by buying back its shares 
from the company that is seeking for the takeover. Like it was mentioned before this 
kind of situation is also called as a greenmail. Share repurchases also have a preventive 
affect as the proportion of shares diminishes and share prices increases making takeover 
more expensive for other corporations. Another good thing about share repurchases is 
that they tend to cut out shareholders who are willing to sell their possessions with a 
low price and thus leaving only shareholders who aren’t willing to give up their share 
for “free”. This is the case especially when repurchases are carried out via tender offers. 
(Bagwell 1991: 72; Bagnoli, Gordon & Lipman 1989.) 
   
 
 
 39 
4. METHODS AND DATA 
 
Data which create the foundation for the empirical part is presented in this chapter with 
detail and also the methods used for hypotheses testing will be illustrated. The effect 
that certain event has for the share price performance can be studied by calculating the 
average abnormal return at the presence of the event in question. After that abnormal 
returns are calculated it will be tested whether those results are in line with thesis’s 
hypotheses. In this thesis Event Study method will be used to examine the abnormal 
returns around open market share repurchases. Event Study method is a good way to 
measure abnormal returns around share buyback announcements and it has been widely 
used in similar studies examining share repurchases. This method will be presented in 
chapter 4.3 with more detail.  
 
4.1 Data presentation 
 
This study is based on data which cover all listed Finnish firms that announced open-
market share repurchase programs during the period from beginning of January 1998 to 
the end of December 2005. Data in this study include total of seven years worth of 
open-market share repurchase announcements and overall it covers 160 samples. Most 
of the samples are from Helsinki Stock Exchange main list but there are also companies 
from I-list and NM-list. Previous similar studies from the Finnish markets have at the 
most used data from beginning of 1998 to the end of 2002. In this study as three extra 
years are added the number of samples will naturally increase and overall it will bring 
lot of new information about the effects what repurchase announcements have in 
Finland. This study covers also year 2000 when technology bubble burst and the 
markets crashed, but overall the crash should not have that much effect on the results in 
this study, except when examining companies from telecommunications & technology 
industry. 
 
Share repurchases usually proceed so that first board proposes that company would start 
repurchase programs. This is described as the authorization application and that is 
usually made at the same context as other proposals for the shareholders’ meeting e.g. 
announcement of dividends and proxy statements. At the shareholders meeting 
authorization application for the start of share repurchases is accepted and according to 
the Finnish law, authorization is valid for only 18 months. Actual announcement for the 
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start of share buybacks has to be announced publicly as well and that date is used as the 
announcement date in this study. Whether or not company actually made any buybacks 
or not will not be taken into the consideration as the focus will be on how the markets 
react to the announcement where company confirms that its going to start share 
repurchases. Announcement itself does not obligate firms to do any actual repurchases. 
 
In Finland is rather easy to find out data for actual share repurchase transactions as the 
law obligates companies to make a public announcement of pretty much everything 
related to share repurchases. All the data for this thesis was gotten from the database of 
University of Vaasa, which includes press releases, daily share prices and performance 
of different indices. The announcement dates for share buybacks were picked up by 
scanning through the press releases of all the companies from year 1998 through 2005. 
Usually repurchase authorization application was released at the same time as other 
board’s proposals for shareholders’ meeting. The announcement for the start of share 
repurchases was given as a separate press release. Actual buyback press release includes 
information about the quantity of shares purchased during the day, the average price of 
acquired shares and the amount of shares held by the company. 
 
Data have been divided into two different groups, to normal and ‘clean’ samples. 
Normal samples include all the share repurchase announcements that were made during 
the seven years. ‘Clean’ ones include samples where announcement of buybacks is 
made and similarly there is not any other confounding news at the same time or at the 
days surrounding this event. More accurately if company had any other publicly 
announced news in the event window of two days before to two days after the 
announcement, then these samples were rejected from the ‘clean’ ones. By taking into 
consideration only the announcements with no other news around it should help to 
identify markets reactions to share repurchase announcements particularly, and result 
that examined reactions from the market will be more reliable and valid. Table 3 
presents the number of buyback announcements that were made and it has been sorted 
to year by year. It can be seen that after the two first years when companies were able to 
buy back its own shares the number of repurchase announcements have stabilised into 
level of little over 20 announcements per year. From the 160 announcements only in 16 
cases companies did not make actual repurchases even though they announced to do so. 
HEX-portfolio index was used as a benchmark when measuring abnormal returns. 
Portfolio index limits the weight of one security to 10% and therefore it was chosen 
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instead of HEX-index. This seems reasonable because Nokia’s weight in normal HEX-
index is way too big as it presents roughly 60% of the total weight. 
 
 
Table 3. Number of share repurchase announcements and actual buybacks. 
  
Share 
repurchase 
announcements 
Actual share 
repurchases made 
Share repur-
chase an-
nouncements, 
clean samples 
Actual share re-
purchases made, 
clean samples 
1998 11 11 8 8 
1999 16 15 3 3 
2000 24 22 8 7 
2001 23 22 14 14 
2002 25 20 6 4 
2003 20 16 5 3 
2004 16 15 7 6 
2005 25 23 8 7 
Overall  160 144 59 52 
 
 
Third research question of this study examines how repurchasing firms are doing 
compared to its industry peers. Do to the lack of firms in the Helsinki stock exchange, 
this intra-industry comparison could only be made within certain industry groups. 
Industry segments for telecommunications & electronics, metal & engineering, forest 
industry, banks & finance, food industry and investment were included in the intra-
industry comparison. These industries contained enough rival firms in order to see 
whether repurchase announcements had any effect on the reference portfolio. By using 
samples from the industries mentioned earlier it totalled overall 79 samples. 27 of those 
observations were ‘clean’ ones, and criteria for ‘clean’ samples was the same as it was 
explained earlier. Table four presents the number of observations in each of the industry 
segments, for both all and ‘clean’ samples. 
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Table 4. Share repurchase announcements inside the industries. 
All Samples 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total 
Telecommunications & 
Electronics   1 3 4 4 1 2   18 
Metal & Engineering 1 3 3 3 2 4 2 3 18 
Forest Industry 1 1 3 3 2 2 2 4 15 
Investment   2 3 1 4 1 1   12 
Banks & Finance         2 1 2 3 8 
Food Industry 2 1 1 1 1     2 8 
Total 4 8 13 12 15 9 9 12 79 
                   
Clean Samples 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total 
Telecommunications & 
Electronics   1 2 1     2   6 
Metal & Engineering 1   2 1         4 
Forest Industry     1           1 
Investment   3 2 1 1   1   8 
Banks & Finance         1   1 1 3 
Food Industry 2   1 1 1       5 
Total 3 4 8 4 3 0 4 1 27 
 
 
Inter-industry comparison will be also illustrated in this study. Unfortunately number of 
share repurchase announcements was too little inside the industries and therefore results 
are not that reliable. For example, industry segment for banking and finance would have 
been interesting to examine but because there were only eight share repurchase 
announcement between years 1998 to 2005 therefore results would not have been 
significant. Inter-industry comparison was therefore made for the three largest industry 
segments in Finnish markets: telecommunications & electronics, metal & engineering 
and forest industry. From table four can be seen the number of share repurchase 
announcements in each industry segments. Those were the industries, which contained 
the largest amount of repurchase announcements. Nevertheless number of samples was 
still a bit too modest in order to make certain conclusions for the different behaviour 
between different industries especially when there are only three industries under 
observation. In addition forest industry included only approximately 6 rivals and that is 
something that has to be taken into consideration when observing the results from forest 
industry. Reason why it was selected as one of the industry groups was because it 
included vast amount of repurchase announcements. When investigating the inter-
industry effect, HEX-portfolio index was used as a benchmark just like it was done 
when testing the first research question.  
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4.2 Defining the time period for actual event and the event window 
 
Like it was mentioned earlier, event in this study is the time when company makes 
announcement that it is going to use shareholders meeting authorization and initiate 
repurchase program. Defining the precise moment when actual event happen is very 
important in studies which are made on a daily basis (Brown & Warner 1980). 
Therefore it had to be well thought what would be the exact time for the actual event in 
order to get the most accurate results. In this thesis 0-day was the day when company 
makes a public announcement (press release) of its intentions to start repurchase 
programs. Press releases were gotten from University of Vaasa database and by 
scanning through the press releases repurchase announcements were picked up. If 
companies made this announcement after 18:00 o’clock then the next day was used as 
the 0-day. 
 
Event periods were divided into three different groups: prior the announcement, around 
the announcement and after the announcement. Event window before the announcement 
was from twenty to three days before repurchase announcement. Event window around 
the repurchase announcement was chosen as two days before and two days after the 
event. These days was chosen mainly because market reaction may not always occur 
that quickly, so by adding two days after day 0 gives more accurate results. Also there is 
always chance for insider trading and therefore two days before the announcement was 
included in this study. Market reactions after the announcement were examined by 
using time period of three to ten days afterwards. All of these time periods were chosen 
mainly because these event periods have been used quite a lot in previous studies from 
different countries such as Ikenberry et.al. (1981) and Liano et.al (2003). By using same 
time periods as previous studies it shows more precisely the similarities or differences 
between the market reactions for repurchase announcements in different countries.   
 
4.3 Event study method 
 
Event study is one of the most used methods in financial researching. It is a very 
common way to analyze how some specific event affects company’s share price.  Using 
financial market data, an event study measures the impact of a specific event on the 
value of a firm (MacKinlay 1997). Point is to find out what part of company’s price 
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change is because of the general fluctuation in the markets and what part is due to some 
company related event. After that it’s statistically investigated whether company’s share 
price differs significantly from its general performance at the presence of some specific 
announcement like for example announcement of share buybacks. Because the 
investigated event might have an effect on share price it is necessary to estimate normal 
return for the event window. Scientific literature has presented three different methods 
for estimating normal return of a share: mean-adjusted return model, market model and 
market-adjusted return model. Even though there is no specific structure for event study 
method but still there are few common guidelines, which are repeated in researches. 
Campbell, Lo & MacKinlay (1997) defined seven different steps, which are common 
for event studies.  
 
Event definition. First step is to define the event that will be investigated and also the 
event period where the effect for share price will be examined. The period of interest is 
often expanded to several days including at least the days before and after the 
announcement. This captures the price effects for announcements, which occur after the 
stock market closes on the announcement day.  
 
Event in this study will be the announcement of open market share repurchases and 
abnormal returns around the event will be calculated in three different time periods: [-
20,-3];[-2,+2];[+3,+10]. Reason why event window from two days before and two days 
after the announcement are used in the first research question is because usually some 
abnormal returns are discovered on the days surrounding the announcement as well. 
Abnormal returns appearing after the announcement day may be because it takes a 
while before new information is reflected into the share price. Other reason might be 
due to the fact that the announcement is made so late in day zero, sometimes even after 
the markets are closed and therefore effect from the announcement will be reflected in 
prices on the day which follow the announcement. On the other hand abnormal returns 
prior the announcement may come from a leakage of the information from people who 
has access to it, also known as inside trading. 
 
Selection criteria. After the event of interest has been identified then criteria why some 
firms are included has to be defined. Also this means that some of the firms are 
excluded because including them would cause biases in results. For example in this 
research as intra-industry comparison is made, specific industry will function as the 
selection criteria.  
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Normal and abnormal returns. Abnormal returns are examined for finding out impact 
that the event has on share price. Abnormal returns are calculated by deducting the 
estimated normal returns from the realized returns around the time of event window. 
Counting the abnormal returns is essential part of event study method. Normal return 
would be the one that stock price would experience without the specific event. 
Therefore normal return must be estimated. Scientific literature uses basically three 
different methods for estimation of normal returns: Mean-adjusted return model, 
Market-adjusted return model and Market model. 
 
Mean-adjusted model assumes that the average return for shares stays constant over 
time, so expected return for each share stays the same. According to mean-adjusted 
return model expected return for share i at time t is then K i . Abnormal return is 
calculated by deducting expected return from realized return. The Mean Adjusted 
Returns model is similar with the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Both assume that 
security’s expected return is constant and that security has also constant systematic risk. 
(Brown & Warner 1980: 207-208.) 
 
(1) AR it  = R it - K i  
 
AR it  = Abnormal return for share i at time t 
R it  = Realized return for share i at time t 
K i  = Expected return for share i, remains constant over time 
 
Market-adjusted model is based on an assumption that all shares experience pretty much 
the same reaction on the markets. As the market portfolio is a linear combination for all 
the shares in the market it is assumed that expected return for a share is the same as for 
the markets overall. Abnormal returns are then simply calculated by deducting general 
return of stock markets from share’s return. (Brown et al. 1980: 208.) 
 
(2) AR it  = R it - R mt  
 
AR it  = Abnormal return for share i at time t 
R it  = Realized return for share i at time t 
R mt  = Realized return for the markets at time t 
 
Market model is a statistical model which takes into consideration share price return and 
market portfolio’s return in the past. This method is quite easy to use and straight 
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forward. Therefore it has been used quite a lot in scientific literature. Model is based on 
the assumption of normal distributed share price fluctuations. Market model gives 
return for any specific share i: 
 
(3) itR  = iα  - iβ  mtR  + itε  , where E( itε ) = 0 ; Var = 
2δ ′  
 
itR  = Realized return for share i at time t 
iα  = Constant term for share i in the regression model for return 
iβ  = Beta for share i in the regression model for return 
mtR  = Realized return for the markets at time t 
itε  = Residual term for share i at time t in the regression model  
 
Market model is a potential improvement for the constant mean return model. By 
removing the portion of the return what is related to variation in the market’s return, 
therefore variation for the abnormal return is reduced. (Brown et al. 1980: 208.) Market 
model will be used in this thesis for the estimation of normal returns. It is better choice 
especially for Finnish markets where shares are thinly traded.  
 
Estimation procedure. Once a normal performance model has been selected the 
parameters of the model must be estimated using data prior the actual event. That period 
is called estimation window. Usually the event period is excluded from the estimation 
period so it won’t influence parameters estimates. Better estimation of normal returns 
will be achieved when using sufficient estimation window. This thesis will follow 
previous studies about share repurchases and use estimation window from -220 to -11 
days.  
 
Testing procedure. When parameter estimates for normal performance model has been 
done then the abnormal returns can be calculated. Next the testing framework for 
abnormal returns has to be designed. Significant things are also defining the null 
hypotheses and determining the techniques for summing up the abnormal returns of 
individual companies. Now that normal returns are going to be estimated with the help 
of market model next step is to estimate abnormal returns on day t for a given security. 
The residual term from the market model will help to determine the risk-adjusted 
abnormal return.  
 
(4)  itAR  = itε  = itR  - ( iα  + iβ  R mt ) 
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In formula 4, R it  is the return for security i on day t and α  and β  -values are calculated 
for share i at time t. For all companies making share repurchases the average abnormal 
return on time t can be calculated with formula: 
 
(5) tAR =            
 
where n is the number of samples and itε  is the daily abnormal return for share i at time 
t. Cumulative average abnormal return (CAR) for time period from 1t to 2t is calculated 
as the sum of average abnormal returns and it can be computed from a formula: 
 
(6)                 = 21
t
tCAR  
 
Statistical significance for cumulative abnormal returns can be examined with the help 
of t-test. Assumption in the t-test is that security daily abnormal returns are 
independently and identically distributed in the event period. When investigating 
whether the cumulative average abnormal return in the event window differs 
significantly from 0, a t-statistic is computed: 
 
(7)  
 
Observations are share repurchasing companies’ abnormal returns in a time period from 
t to t+n (CAR), standard deviation for the whole sample (δ ) and the number of days in 
the event window (n). Standard deviations for abnormal returns are calculated from 
estimation window of -220 to -21 days on each share.                             
 
Empirical results. These results are effect of performing phases described earlier. From 
there we can see which hypotheses held and which were scientifically significant. Also 
it has to keep in mind that empirical results may be heavily influenced by one or two 
firms. So that is something that has to take into consideration as well. Empirical results 
leads to last phase which is interpretation and conclusions. Results must be analyzed 
and investigated why and why not hypotheses held or didn’t.  
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5. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
This chapter presents the empirical evidence for the hypotheses presented earlier. 
Results will be presented in the same order as hypotheses were presented in chapter one. 
Scientific literature focused on share repurchases e.g. Stephens et.al. (1998) and 
Ikenberry et.al. (1995) have generally made conclusions that announcements of share 
repurchase programs are preceded by poor performance, greeted positively by the 
markets and followed with positive reaction. Same kinds of results have been observed 
from Finnish markets as well by Tomperi (2004) and Hyypiä (2005). This thesis will 
participate to the scientific debate about share repurchases by strengthening previous 
conclusions with newer data and also by making some new contribution with improved 
data and with inter-industry comparison. 
 
5.1 Market reaction around the event period 
 
This thesis will present empirical evidence on how markets react to the share repurchase 
announcements by studying whether there are any abnormal returns surrounding the 
event. Procedure for share repurchases from the beginning to the end can be divided in 
to four different stages. First step is the board’s application for shareholders meeting for 
the start of buybacks, then in the shareholders meeting board’s application will be 
approved. Third stage is when company makes the actual announcement that it will use 
the shareholders meeting approval for buybacks and final phase is when the actual 
repurchase occurs.  
 
Earlier researches from Finnish markets have mostly used the authorization application 
as the announcement date for buybacks. Board’s application for share repurchases is 
usually contained in the invitation for shareholder meeting and this invitation contains 
all the issues that will be handled at the shareholder’s meeting e.g. amount of dividends 
that will be paid to shareholders etc. That’s why it might not be that reliable to use 
authorization application as the event day if the aim is to solely distinguish how markets 
interpret company’s intentions to buy back its own shares. Invitation to shareholder’s 
meeting contains too much confounding news and that’s why this thesis will solely 
investigate market reactions around the actual announcement day. Appendix 2 contains 
an example of the actual announcement what companies have to publicly make when 
they have decided to use shareholders meeting’s approval for share repurchases. Some 
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studies have used also shareholders meeting’s approval for buybacks as the event day, 
but again usually there are lot of other things decided in those meetings and that’s why 
it’s hard to specify what is the issue where markets are reacting. 
 
Samples used in this thesis were divided into normal samples and ‘clean’ samples. 
Clean samples didn’t include any confounding news at the presence of repurchase 
announcement, meaning that from two days before and two days after the event day 
there weren’t any other news announced by the company in question. Typically at the 
presence of normal samples there might have been some other announcements made by 
the company, days before or after the event day and that might have had effect on the 
market reactions.  
 
Figure 2 will present how the cumulative abnormal return has developed from day -20 
to day +10 around the share repurchase announcement. Figure includes all the samples 
from the beginning of year 1998 to the end of year 2005, also clean samples are 
presented separately in order to illustrate the differences between all- and clean samples. 
It can clearly be seen from the figure that share prices tend to perform negatively or not 
so well before the actual announcement and around the event day and afterwards there 
are positive abnormal returns for share repurchasing firms. Noticeable is also that 
abnormal returns are much more modest to samples where all the announcements are 
included and group of clean samples experience stronger effect of abnormal returns 
around the event day. The way CAR-line behaves in figure 2 is in line with previous 
studies on how share price moves before and after repurchase announcement and it also 
gives some evidence to the theoretical reasons behind share repurchases and those will 
be presented next. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Share Repurchase Announcements. 
 
 
Table five shows the results that were gotten from investigating the statistical 
significance of cumulative abnormal returns around the event day from years 1998 to 
2005. Abnormal returns were estimated by using market model. Statistical significance 
for abnormal returns was studied with the help of Student’s t-test, like it was described 
in the previous chapter. Cumulative abnormal returns were calculated from time period 
of 20 days before and 10 days after the event. First column in table 2 tells the event 
period and the second column shows the cumulative abnormal return, third column 
presents the t-value and the third one indicates the statistical significance of the t-test. 
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Table 5. Market reaction around the event day. 
All samples N=160     
Event period CAR t-statistics Statistical Significance 
Event day [0] 0,62 % 3,01 *** 
[-20;-3] -0,70 % -0,80 - 
[-2;+2] 0,93 % 2,00 ** 
[+3;+10] 1,30 % 2,22 ** 
        
        
Clean samples N=58     
Event period CAR t-statistics Statistical Significance 
Event day [0] 1,31 % 3,77 *** 
[-20;-3] -1,70 % -1,15 - 
[-2;+2] 2,26 % 2,91 *** 
[+3;+10] 1,45 % 1,48 - 
Statistical significance refers to the confidence level for t-test: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. 
 
 
First hypothesis was that companies making share repurchases experience positive 
abnormal returns around the repurchase announcement. This hypothesis holds as null-
hypothesis has to be rejected. In other words companies’ abnormal returns around the 
event day deviate significantly from zero. When studying group of all samples 0.93% 
abnormal return was observed for five days surrounding the event. Also for days 
following the event from third to tenth day afterwards, 1.30% abnormal return was 
observed. This would indicate that the information from the share repurchase 
announcements takes a while before it is contained to the share price. Both of the results 
for these two event periods were statistically significant with 5% confidence level.  
 
Results from the clean samples were somewhat similar with the ones from all samples. 
Difference was that for the five day event period abnormal returns were stronger as the 
cumulative abnormal return was 2.26% with 1% confidence level. In the days following 
the announcement 1.45% cumulative abnormal returns was observed, but results 
weren’t statistically significant. Samples where there weren’t any confounding news 
around the event experienced quicker and stronger positive reaction from the markets 
for the repurchase announcement. Conclusion can be drawn that markets tend to react 
quickly to the positive signal what repurchase announcements represents. Reaction is 
much quicker in the case of clean samples than what it was when all samples was used. 
Nevertheless results for clean samples are more reliable and therefore it can be stated 
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that markets tend to react positively and quickly to repurchase announcements. 
 
Noticeable is also that results for the zero day were statistically significant with 1% 
confidence level for both all- and clean samples, with 0.62% and 1.31% abnormal 
returns respectively, and these findings are in line with findings from Hyypiä (2005) 
and Karhunen (2002) who found abnormal returns worth of 1.01% and 1.08% 
respectively, for day zero as well. This would indicate that especially in the case of 
clean samples the event in question is greeted with strong positive reaction by the 
markets on the event day. Further it supports the views that markets are acting 
efficiently as the information content about the announcement is partly implemented to 
share price on a same day. 
 
Overall this study indicates that markets tend to react positively to company’s intentions 
to start buying back its own shares. This reaction is in line with finance theory which 
indicates that as number of shares outstanding diminishes via repurchases the value for 
each share should increase (Brealey & Myers 1991: 374-380). Also these results are 
similar with other studies investigating market reactions to buyback announcements. 
Ikenberry et.al. (1995) studied the effect what share repurchase announcement had on 
company’s share price in the United States and they found approximately 3% positive 
abnormal returns from two days before to two days after the announcement, results were 
similar with Ikenberry et.al. (2000) when they investigated the effect from Canadian 
markets. Liano et.al. (2003) also found about 3% cumulative abnormal returns inside 
the same five-day event period that Ikenberry et.al. (1995) used and what is used in this 
study as well. Like it was mentioned earlier, studies from Finnish markets have used 
authorization application as an event when studying share repurchases and those studies 
e.g. Karhunen (2002) and Ihantola (2003) have found approximately 2.80% cumulative 
abnormal return around the five-day event window. However Hyypiä (2005) used actual 
announcement as an event in his studies and he found statistically significant 
cumulative abnormal returns of 1.22% for years 1998 to 2002, when five-day event 
window was used. 
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Table 6. Market reactions to share repurchase announcements year by year. 
  Event window [-20;-3] [-2;+2] [+3;+10] 
1998 CAR 1,35 % 2,85 % -0,97 % 
  t-statistics 0,38 1,32 -0,33 
1999 CAR 0,43 % 1,16 % 0,91 % 
  t-statistics 0,15 0,78 0,49 
2000 CAR -2,82 % 1,45 % 0,22 % 
  t-statistics -1,09 1,06 0,13 
2001 CAR -2,04 % 1,40 % 4,76 % 
  t-statistics -0,74 0,97 2,59 ** 
2002 CAR -1,63 % -2,17 % 0,60 % 
  t-statistics -0,75 -1,91 * 0,42 
2003 CAR 3,10 % 1,24 % 3,49 % 
  t-statistics 1,33 1,01 2,25 ** 
2004 CAR -1,03 % 2,21 % 0,41 % 
  t-statistics -0,56 2,30 ** 0,34 
2005 CAR 2,53 % 0,29 % 0,33 % 
  t-statistics 1,75 * 0,39 0,34 
Statistical significance refers to the confidence level for t-test: ***=1%, **=5%, 
*=10%. 
  
 
Table six illustrates market reactions for share repurchase announcements for different 
years for all the samples. Because each year includes only a few samples, results were 
not statistically significant on a yearly basis. Only in years 2001, 2003 and 2004 there 
were positive market reactions around or after the repurchase announcements with five 
percent confidence level. Number of repurchase announcements is so small in each year 
that it is quite hard to observe any statistically significant returns and therefore only 
when adding the years together number of samples increases and then results get 
powerful enough. 
 
5.2 Market reaction prior to the repurchase announcement 
 
Second hypothesis of this thesis was to investigate if share prices experience negative 
abnormal returns prior to the announcement of share repurchases. Same time it is 
studied if the signalling hypothesis holds in the Finnish markets. Signalling hypothesis 
or undervaluation hypothesis is something that has been studied in scientific literature 
and it is speculated as one of the reasons why companies initiate share repurchase 
programs in the first place - to show to the general public that at the moment company’s 
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share is undervalued. Undervaluation hypothesis also means that share price 
performance before the repurchase announcement has been negative and the actual 
announcement or buyback is greeted positively by the markets as it signals that 
company is worth more than it is valued at the moment. 
 
Second hypothesis was tested by using event period of 20 to 3 days before the actual 
announcement. For the all-samples a cumulative abnormal return of -0.70% was 
observed but it was not statistically significant. Clean samples on the other hand 
indicated a bit stronger negative cumulative abnormal returns with -1.70% figure, but 
still it gave only weak support as results were not statistically significant. When event 
window of 17 to 6 days prior the announcement was used in the case of clean samples -
2.67% negative cumulative abnormal returns with 5% significance level was observed. 
That is in line with findings from Karhunen (2002) where he also found negative CAR 
of -3.10% over the days -17 to -6, with same level of significance. Previous studies have 
found negative abnormal returns prior the share repurchase announcement e.g. Liano 
et.al. (2003), Ikenberry et.al. (1995) and Comment & Jarrell (1991). From the Finnish 
markets besides Karhunen (2002) also Tomperi (2004) found support for signalling 
hypothesis in the case of actual share repurchases as he found that managers are timing 
actual buybacks to a time-period when share has performed badly for a while.  
 
All in all this study gives support for the signalling hypothesis that share prices are 
performing negatively before the buyback announcement. For the clean samples CAR is 
negative through days -19 to -6 before the actual announcement with 5% significance 
level, this can clearly be seen from figure one as well. Interestingly after sixth day prior 
to the announcement CAR turns to positive, but before that there is statistically 
significant evidence about the negative cumulative abnormal returns. When CAR turns 
to positive on day -5 that might indicate that information about companies’ intentions of 
announcing the start of share repurchase programs might be leaking to the public. 
Leakage of insider information has been speculated to be one reason why share price 
has started to behave like assumed before the actual event. Table seven shows CAR 
before the share repurchase announcement and also the significance levels. 
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Table 7. Cumulative abnormal returns prior the share repurchase announcements. 
Clean samples N=58     
Event period CAR t-statistics Statistical Significance 
[-20;-6] -2,53 % -1,88 * 
[-19;-6] -2,88 % -2,22 ** 
[-18;-6] -2,84 % -2,27 ** 
[-17;-6] -2,66 % -2,21 ** 
[-16;-6] -2,57 % -2,24 ** 
[-15;-6] -2,37 % -2,16 ** 
[-14;-6] -1,89 % -1,81 * 
[-13;-6] -1,80 % -1,84 * 
[-12;-6] -1,73 % -1,89 * 
[-11;-6] -1,86 % -2,19 ** 
Statistical significance refers to the confidence level for t-test: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. 
 
 
5.3 Intra-industry comparison 
 
Intra-industry comparison was done for six different industry segments: 
telecommunications & electronics, metal & engineering, forest industry, banks & 
finance, food industry and investment. Decision to include only these six industry 
segments was due to the lack of data regarding other industries and those issues that 
were discussed in chapter 4.1 with more detail. Third hypothesis of this thesis was to 
investigate how companies who are making announcements about share repurchases 
perform against their industry peers around the event. Research was done so that for 
each of the industry segments relevant industry index was used as a reference portfolio. 
Each industry index included enough companies in order to see if one company’s 
announcement would have any effect on rival companies in the same industry. Number 
of companies in each industry index generally ranged from five to seven, except metal 
& engineering and telecommunications & electronics which had 14 and 26 companies 
respectively. Also intra-industry comparison was done for only to clean sample 
companies, meaning that there were not any other confounding news at the presence of 
share repurchases. Other news announcement might have had influence on the results so 
therefore there were only 27 observations included. It is better to use only clean samples 
so that the effect of repurchase announcement to other companies is better established. 
Table eight presents the results how reference portfolio (industry index) performed 
against the HEX-portfolio index around the share repurchase announcement. For 
measuring these excess returns in comparison to peer firms, the abnormal returns were 
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calculated from 20 days before to 10 days after the announcement relative to HEX-
portfolio index.  
 
 
Table 8. Intra-industry comparison with clean samples. 
Intra-industry comparison with clean sam-
ples N=27 
Event period CAR t-statistics Statistical Significance 
Event day [0] -0,11 % -0,41 - 
[-20;-3] -1,99 % -1,74 * 
[-2;+2] -0,61 % -1,01 - 
[+3;+10] -0,45 % -0,59 - 
 
 
Results presented in table eight do not give any support for contagious or competitive 
effect. Even though around the event day there seems to be negative CAR worth of -
0.61% for the reference portfolio, but still results aren’t statistically significant. 
Although for the days before the announcement reference portfolio experienced 
approximately two percent negative cumulative abnormal returns for twenty to three 
days before the announcement. CAR prior the announcement was only supported with 
10% confidence level, which is quite weak. Like it was illustrated in chapter 5.2 
repurchasing companies experienced negative abnormal returns prior the announcement 
and these findings give support to undervaluation hypothesis what was examined 
previously. It seems that besides the poor share price performance what announcing 
companies have prior to the repurchase announcement, announcing company’s industry 
overall performs poorly prior the announcement.  
 
All together these findings indicate that reference portfolio for the announcing company 
is not affected by share repurchase intentions of a one company. These findings are 
similar with previous studies regarding intra-industry comparison around share 
repurchase announcements. Chang et.al. (2005) also found that both the announcing and 
rival firms experience significant undervaluation before the announcement of share 
buyback. This thesis’s findings are similar with Hertzel’s (1991) results as it can be 
summarized that reaction from the repurchase announcements are mainly firm specific 
and in the short term there are not any competitive or contagious effects. 
 
As it was presented in table eight how reference portfolio made out of rival firms 
performed against the HEX-portfolio index around the event. Table nine presents the 
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results for the same samples as in table eight, but only how companies making share 
repurchases performed against HEX-portfolio index. Even though results for the market 
reaction around share repurchases were presented previously in chapter 5.1 when 
thesis’s first research question was examined. Still it was reasonable to examine how 
only these 27 announcing companies performed around the event. This was because it 
was interesting to compare what were the reactions around the event for announcing 
companies and for the reference portfolio as well. By using the same 27 companies 
sample in both of these cases the different reaction from the markets could be illustrated 
more clearly. 
 
 
Table 9. Market reaction around share repurchase announcement. 
Market reaction around share repurchase an-
nouncement N=27 
Event period CAR t-statistics Statistical Significance 
Event day [0] 1,24 % 2,52 ** 
[-20;+3] -3,00 % -1,44 - 
[-2;+2] 3,08 % 2,80 *** 
[+3;+10] 1,40 % 1,01 - 
Statistical significance refers to the confidence level for t-test: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. 
 
 
Table nine presents results which are similar with the ones that were gotten when 
examining the first hypothesis. CAR is positive on the event day and in the five-day 
event window with positive abnormal returns of 1.24% and 3.08% respectively. While 
announcing companies experience significantly positive CAR around the event there is 
no statistically significant returns for reference portfolio, though returns for the 
reference portfolio seems to be a bit negative. Figure three also illustrates the behaviour 
of CAR for both of these samples. Before the announcement both reference portfolio 
and announcing firms experience negative price performance, but around and after the 
announcement announcing companies market reaction turns significantly positive.  
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Figure 3. Comparison between reference portfolio and announcing company. 
 
 
Previously it was examined how repurchasing companies and how reference portfolio 
(industry index) reacts around repurchase announcements relative to the general market 
index. Also it was interesting to investigate how repurchasing companies perform 
relative to the industry index in question. This was done by using simple market model 
in the estimation of abnormal returns and industry index was used as a benchmark 
instead of HEX-portfolio index. Same six industries were used here for the same 
reasons what was presented earlier. For measuring these excess returns in comparison to 
industry index, abnormal returns were calculated from 20 days before to 10 days after 
the announcement just like it was done previously. Table 4 summarizes the results for 
abnormal returns relative to an industry index. 
 
 
Table 10. Cumulative abnormal returns relative to industry index. 
All Samples N=79     
Event period CAR t-statistics Statistical Significance 
Event day [0] -0,27 % -1,230 - 
[-20;+3] -1,49 % -1,564 - 
[-2;+2] 0,44 % 0,880 - 
[+3;+10] 1,41 % 2,825 *** 
Statistical significance refers to the confidence level for t-test: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. 
CAR around the repurchase announcement
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Results from this intra-industry comparison shows that the null hypothesis is accepted at 
the presence of share repurchase announcement. Cumulative abnormal returns for day 
zero and the five-day event window are 0.27% and 0.44% respectively, and these results 
are not statistically significant. Therefore findings from this study don’t give any 
support that repurchasing companies would experience any abnormal returns relative to 
the industry index. In the days following the announcement from three to ten days 
afterwards CAR was 1.41% with 1% confidence level, which gives strong statistical 
evidence that repurchasing companies experience positive abnormal returns after the 
repurchase announcement.  
 
When investigating these results in more detail conclusions can be made that share 
repurchasing companies don’t outperform their industry peers and hypothesis of 
competitive effect can be rejected. If looking back to chapter 5.1, results in the five-day 
event window for all the clean samples were 2.26% CAR with 1% confidence level, 
which were very strong and significant. On the other hand when industry index was 
used as a benchmark CAR was only 0.45% and there weren’t any signs of statistical 
significance for the event window in question. These results could be interpreted that in 
the five-day event window share repurchasing firms’ returns compared to applicable 
industry index does not significantly differ from zero and null hypothesis can be 
accepted.  
 
When the announcing firms are compared to markets overall (HEX-portfolio index) 
they clearly outperform the markets around the event day and five-day event window 
like it was presented in chapter 5.1. As a matter of fact conclusions could be made that 
when the announcing firms significantly outperform HEX-portfolio index and yet there 
is no signs of abnormal return when announcing firms are compared to the industry 
index, it can be concluded that returns for share repurchasing firms and for the industry 
index are somewhat similar around the event day. Further these findings could be 
interpreted in a way that rival firms experience positive market reactions together with 
the announcing company and therefore it would give small support for the contagion 
hypothesis that industry overall benefits from repurchasing company’s positive market 
reaction. Markets are interpreting announcing companies’ positive price increases 
around the five-day event window as a positive signal to the whole industry. Chang 
et.al. (2005) received same kind of results from Taiwan markets. While Liano et.al. 
(2003) and Hertzel (1991) didn’t find any evidence for contagious nor competitive 
effect from the US markets.  
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Statistically significant positive market reaction what was gotten for the days after the 
announcement could then be interpreted that the positive signal what repurchase 
announcements give is included into the share price only in the days following the 
event. But when taking into consideration the fact that when HEX-portfolio index was 
used as a benchmark market reacted quickly into the new information what was gotten 
and therefore more accurate interpretation would be that industry index reacts positively 
to one company’s share repurchase announcements and reaction lasts only for the five 
days and after that repurchasing companies still experience positive abnormal returns 
relative to the industry index. In other words industry index and therefore rival 
companies benefit from one company’s repurchase announcement in the five-day event 
window and announcing companies positive market reaction just lasts longer. 
 
Overall results are somewhat similar before the actual event whether HEX-portfolio 
index or applicable industry index was used as a benchmark. Difference was that 
abnormal returns are considerably modest in the case of industry index and like it was 
mentioned earlier there weren’t observed any statistical significance CAR. In both cases 
abnormal returns followed same pattern in way that before the announcement share 
price performed negatively and at the presence and after the event share price performed 
positively. Figure four illustrates these findings. Nevertheless the most interesting part 
is around the five day event window where CAR starts to differ a lot between samples 
where HEX-index is used and when industry index is used as a benchmark or reference 
portfolio. This clearly rejects the competitive effect hypothesis as the curve mildly 
supports contagious effect hypothesis as industry index experience same kind of market 
movements as companies making share repurchase announcements. Nevertheless 
support for the contagious hypothesis should be interpreted quite carefully.  
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Figure 4. Cumulative abnormal returns in the case of different benchmarks. 
 
 
One area of interest in this study was also to see if there were any differences between 
different industry segments on how they react around share repurchase announcements. 
Liano et.al. (2003) resulted in their study that there were large differences between 
industries reactions to share repurchase announcements. Same kind of results from 
Finnish markets was quite hard to observe, mainly due to the lack of data. Also there are 
only few industries where there are enough companies and enough repurchase 
announcements to make results reliable. Therefore data in this study is limited to three 
different industries. Table ten presents results for the different industries what was used 
in this study. Data comes from all the share repurchase announcements which were 
observed and compared against HEX-portfolio index. Then samples were divided into 
three different industry segments in order to see whether there were any differences how 
companies reacted in different industries. 
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Table 10. Cumulative abnormal results from different industries. 
Telecommunications 
& Electronics N=18     
Event period CAR t-statistics Statistical Significance 
Event day [0] -1,05 % -1,512 - 
[-20;+3] -0,63 % -0,215 - 
[-2;+2] -3,59 % -2,313 ** 
[+3;+10] 3,36 % 1,712 - 
Metal & Engineering N=18     
Event period CAR t-statistics Statistical Significance 
Event day [0] 0,26 % 0,481 - 
[-20;+3] -4,20 % -1,826 * 
[-2;+2] 0,87 % 0,721 - 
[+3;+10] 2,23 % 1,455 - 
Forest Industry N=18     
Event period CAR t-statistics Statistical Significance 
Event day [0] -0,66 % -1,262 - 
[-20;+3] 0,17 % 0,078 - 
[-2;+2] 0,57 % 0,487 - 
[+3;+10] 1,41 % 0,955 - 
Statistical significance refers to the confidence level for t-test: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. 
 
 
First two industries follows again same pattern in a way that prior the announcement 
there is negative price performance and after the announcement companies experience 
positive abnormal returns. Difference is only that reaction is quicker with metal & 
engineering companies and with telecommunications & electronics positive abnormal 
returns starts to cumulate only after third day. Companies in forest industries experience 
quite modest price fluctuations and results aren’t statistically significant. Interestingly 
companies in telecommunications and electronics experience statistically significant 
negative returns of -3.59% during the five-day event window, while if taking into 
consideration all the samples results are significantly positive on the same event 
window. This indicates that positive reaction from the markets towards companies in 
the telecommunications and electronics industry is contained into share prices not until 
a few days after the announcement. Also is good to keep in mind that industry segment 
for Telecommunications & Electronics was very volatile especially during years 1999-
2001, because of the technology bubble bursting. So that might have effect on these 
results especially in the part of technology firms. Overall sample in this thesis in order 
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to compare how companies are reacting from different industries is too small in order to 
get strong results to one way or the other. So therefore this comparison is just more of 
an illustration of the events rather than a strong scientific contribution. Figure five 
illustrates how differently announcing firms performed from different industries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Cumulative abnormal returns from different industries. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
Purpose of this study was to investigate how Finnish markets react to companies’ share 
repurchase announcements. History of share repurchases is still somewhat short in 
Finland as repurchases have been legal only after the year 1998. Since then amount of 
repurchases have steadily increased over years. The number of share repurchases has 
actually increased all over the world in recent decade, besides Finland lot of other 
European countries have legalized share repurchases at the end of the 90’s. In the 
United States repurchases have been very popular for quite many years now and lot of 
studies have been made from this area of research. In the 90’s amount of share 
repurchases passed dividend payments as the most popular method for profit sharing in 
the United States. 
 
Nowadays it is very common that Finnish companies apply for permission from 
shareholders meeting to start share repurchases. Meaning that lot of companies in 
Helsinki stock exchange has the authorization to start share repurchases but in practice 
only minority of those authorizations is used. Companies tend to apply for the 
authorization for just in case they want to use it. If company decides to utilize 
shareholders meeting’s authorization then actual announcement for the start of share 
repurchases has to be made. That is the actual share repurchase announcement and it 
was used as the event in this study as well. Finnish legislation requires that companies 
inform investors publicly about every step regarding share repurchases, authorization 
application, approval for authorization, announcement for the start of share repurchases 
and actual repurchases as well. None of these phases obligates companies to move to 
the next phase. Most of the companies in this study were from Helsinki stock exchange 
main list but there were also some companies from NM- and I-lists. Samples included 
161 observations of repurchase announcements in total, where 59 of them were ‘clean’ 
samples, which meant that during the five-day event window there weren’t any other 
confounding news at the presence of share repurchase announcement. 
 
First purpose of this study was to examine whether companies announcing repurchases 
experience any positive abnormal returns at time of the announcement. Study was 
carried out for both all samples and clean samples. Results were similar in both of these 
cases and like it could be predicted in the case of clean samples results were much 
stronger. For all of the 161 observations positive cumulative abnormal return of 1.41% 
was observed in the five-day event window and on the event day abnormal return was 
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0.63%. In the case of 59 repurchase announcement where there weren’t any other 
confounding news around the event CAR was 2.24% at the time period from two days 
before to two days after the announcement and on day zero positive abnormal return 
worth of 1.23% was observed. Empirical results give strong evidence that when 
companies announces that they are going to initiate share repurchase program markets 
tend to react positively to that announcement. Especially the results from clean samples 
can be interpreted as reliable because around the announcement there weren’t any other 
important news announced which might have affected share prices. These findings are 
in line with other international studies where positive abnormal returns have been 
observed for the announcement day and for the five-day event period around the event.  
 
Second research question was to examine if signaling hypothesis holds in the Finnish 
markets. Many studies especially the ones coming from the United States suggests that 
companies use repurchases to give signal to the markets that share is undervalued at the 
moment. Empirical evidence for this hypothesis has been observed as there have been 
noticed to be negative abnormal returns prior the announcements and then positive 
abnormal returns following the announcements. This thesis gives support for signaling 
hypothesis as well with empirical results from Finnish markets. Interestingly abnormal 
returns were negative until the sixth day before the event and after that returns slowly 
started to turn in to positive. Statistically significant negative CAR was observed from 
event periods of [-20;-6] to [-11;-6] and in the event window [-19;-6] negative CAR was 
-2.88% which was the highest observation. Overall when also combining results from 
the first research question it can be concluded that before the repurchase announcement 
there were negative abnormal returns and announcement was followed with positive 
abnormal returns. These findings gave strong support for the signaling hypothesis that 
before repurchases, company’s share is undervalued.  
 
Intra-industry comparison was done for specific industries only, telecommunications & 
electronics, metal & engineering, forest industry, banks & finance, food industry and 
investment were the industry segments which were chosen. This was mainly because 
there were only few industries where there were enough rivals and enough repurchase 
announcements in order to make reliable comparisons. Industry index itself was used as 
a reference portfolio and its performance was compared against HEX-portfolio index, 
and therefore it was interesting to see if there were any abnormal returns to the 
reference portfolio at the same time when one of its companies made repurchase 
announcements. International studies for this area of interest have yet been 
inconclusive, but most of the studies have not found any strong evidence that 
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repurchase announcement would have competitive or contagious effect on the rival 
firms. This thesis’s results are similar and conclusion is that positive market reaction 
what repurchase announcement brings to company is mainly firm specific. Though 
negative abnormal return was observed for the whole industry prior the announcement 
and this indicates that before the announcement as well as the repurchasing company 
also the industry overall performs quite poorly. Inter-industry comparison was also 
conducted between different industries, but mainly due to the lack of data there weren’t 
observed any significant differences how repurchases are welcomed by the markets for 
different industries. 
 
For conclusion it can be said that this thesis’s contribution is three-fold. First this thesis 
gives strong evidence on how markets welcome companies’ intentions to start 
repurchases. Earlier studies from Finland have used authorization application or 
approval as the event day and by using the actual announcement as event this thesis 
gives stronger results about market reactions to repurchases. Authorization application 
or approval is usually released to the public at the same time as other news from the 
shareholders meeting so therefore market’s reactions for companies’ repurchase 
intentions solely is hard to point out. So as this study uses actual repurchase 
announcements and also when samples are thinned out to clean samples so that there are 
not any confounding news on the days surrounding the event. It’s safe to say that 
companies repurchase announcements are greeted quickly and positively by the 
markets. Second undervaluation hypothesis gets support from this thesis. Market 
reactions being negative before the announcement and then turning into positive, it 
proves that management intention to give positive signal to markets is successful. Third 
it can be concluded that the information from share repurchases is mainly firm-specific, 
though mild support for contagious effect was observed. 
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APPENDIX 1  
 
Finnish Share Repurchase Programs in 1998-2005 
 
Company 
Authorisation 
application 
Authorisation 
starts 
Authorisation 
ends 
Announcement 
date 
First actual 
repurchase 
Cultor I 98/10/01 98/11/17 99/11/17 98/11/20 98/04/12 
Cultor II 98/10/01 98/11/17 99/11/17 98/11/20 98/04/12 
Finvest A 98/03/17 98/04/07 99/04/07 98/05/12 98/11/17 
FInvest B 98/03/17 98/04/07 99/04/07 98/05/12 98/05/25 
Jaakko Pöyry 98/02/26 98/03/31 99/03/31 98/05/14 98/07/03 
Lännen Tehtaat 98/03/03 98/04/02 99/04/02 98/09/14 98/09/23 
Rocla 98/03/16 98/04/01 99/04/01 98/09/01 98/09/10 
Tamro 98/05/22 98/06/17 99/06/17 98/06/26 98/07/13 
Tieto Corporation 98/02/26 98/03/13 99/03/13 98/08/26 98/09/07 
UPM-Kymmene 97/12/19 98/03/25 99/03/25 98/03/26 98/04/03 
Uponor 98/02/18 98/03/18 99/03/18 98/06/24 98/03/08 
Citycon 99/09/24 99/11/04 00/03/30 99/11/17 99/11/25 
Interavanti 99/03/24 99/04/09 99/04/09 99/05/12 99/05/31 
Jaakko Pöyry 99/02/18 99/03/19 00/03/19 99/06/24   
KCI Konecranes international 99/02/11 99/03/11 00/03/11 99/09/30 99/10/07 
Kemira 99/02/19 99/04/07 00/04/07 99/06/08 99/06/15 
Lännen Tehtaat 99/03/02 99/04/15 00/04/15 99/05/10 99/10/15 
Metso 99/07/01 99/08/18 00/08/18 99/09/30 99/10/12 
Nokia 99/10/21 99/12/13 00/12/13 00/02/01 00/02/21 
Rocla 99/03/08 99/03/26 00/03/26 99/04/16 99/06/08 
Sampo A 99/03/04 99/04/28 00/04/28 99/12/22 00/01/03 
Sponda 99/02/17 99/03/10 00/03/10 99/08/28 99/09/06 
Talentum 99/03/05 99/03/29 00/03/29 99/05/18 99/05/26 
Tamro 99/03/25 99/04/28 00/04/28 99/05/07 99/06/18 
UPM-Kymmene 99/02/12 99/03/24 00/03/24 99/08/23 99/08/30 
Uponor 99/02/16 99/03/17 00/03/17 99/03/30 99/04/07 
YIT-Yhtymä 99/02/17 99/03/09 00/03/09 99/03/12 99/03/18 
Amer A 00/02/09 00/03/08 01/03/08 00/11/02 00/11/10 
Aspo 00/03/03 00/03/13 01/03/13 00/05/29 00/06/07 
Citycon 00/02/29 00/03/30 01/03/30 00/04/27 00/05/09 
Efore A 00/02/29 00/03/17 01/03/17 00/08/03 00/08/24 
Instrumentarium 00/02/23 00/03/23 01/03/23 00/06/29   
Kemira 00/03/14 00/04/11 01/04/11 00/05/09 00/05/23 
Kone 00/01/11 00/02/25 01/02/25 00/03/08 00/03/16 
Lännen Tehtaat 00/03/07 00/04/13 01/04/13 00/05/15 00/06/22 
Martela A 00/02/18 00/03/21 01/03/21 00/11/29 00/12/20 
Nokia 00/02/01 00/03/22 01/03/22 00/07/28   
Rautaruukki 00/02/10 00/03/28 01/03/28 00/03/31 00/04/10 
Rocla 00/05/29 00/06/15 01/06/15 00/06/21 00/07/13 
Soltec/TH tiedonhallinta 00/03/16 00/03/31 01/03/31 00/08/15 00/09/06 
Sonera 00/02/16 00/03/22 01/03/22 00/04/26 00/06/09 
Sponda 00/03/14 00/03/27 01/03/27 00/05/03 00/05/11 
Sponda 00/11/29 00/12/14 01/12/14 00/12/22 01/01/04 
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Stockmann A 00/03/15 00/04/11 01/04/11 00/05/17 00/05/24 
Stockmann B 00/03/15 00/04/11 01/04/11 00/05/17 00/05/24 
Stora Enso A 99/08/20 00/03/20 01/03/20 00/08/18 00/09/14 
Stora Enso R 99/08/20 00/03/20 01/03/20 00/08/18 00/09/14 
SysOpen 00/11/02 00/11/23 01/11/23 00/11/30 01/02/12 
Tulikivi 00/03/17 00/04/26 01/04/26 00/05/04 00/11/01 
UPM-Kymmene 00/05/16 00/06/13 01/06/13 00/06/13 00/06/21 
Uponor 00/02/16 00/03/21 01/03/21 00/08/01 00/12/13 
Amer A 01/02/07 01/03/07 02/03/07 01/04/05 01/04/17 
Aspo 01/02/15 01/04/26 02/04/26 01/10/26 01/11/02 
Aspocomp Group 01/02/19 01/03/23 02/03/23 01/07/16 01/07/30 
Citycon 01/02/23 01/03/29 02/03/29 01/04/23   
Etteplan 01/02/22 01/03/28 02/03/28 01/09/10 01/09/19 
Huhtamäki 01/02/13 01/04/03 02/04/03 01/04/03 01/04/11 
Jaakko Pöyry 01/02/13 01/03/08 02/03/08 01/03/09 01/08/23 
Kemira 01/02/12 01/04/03 02/04/03 01/04/24 01/05/02 
Kone 01/01/10 01/02/23 02/02/23 01/03/07 01/03/29 
Kyro 01/05/15 01/06/12 02/06/12 01/08/17 01/08/30 
Martela A 01/02/20 01/03/21 02/03/21 01/10/30 01/11/14 
Neomarkka 01/02/08 01/03/20 02/03/19 01/04/02 01/04/11 
Outokumpu 01/01/31 01/03/21 02/03/21 01/03/22 01/04/09 
Perlos 01/03/30 01/04/19 02/04/19 01/09/07 01/09/14 
Rautaruukki 01/02/06 01/03/29 02/03/29 01/04/03 01/04/11 
Stora Enso A 01/02/07 01/03/20 02/03/19 01/03/29 01/03/28 
Stora Enso R 01/02/07 01/03/20 02/03/19 01/03/29 01/03/28 
Tekla 01/03/15 01/04/05 02/04/05 01/09/17 01/09/26 
Teleste 01/03/01 01/04/06 02/04/06 01/06/18 01/06/27 
TietoEnator 01/02/15 01/03/22 02/03/22 01/09/19 01/10/02 
Tieto-X 01/03/22 01/04/10 02/04/10 01/08/28 01/09/05 
UPM-Kymmene 01/02/21 01/03/22 02/03/22 01/03/22 01/03/29 
Uponor 01/02/08 01/03/13 02/03/13 01/04/02 01/04/24 
Aspocomp Group 02/02/15 02/04/05 03/04/05 02/05/07 02/05/14 
CapMan B 02/02/26 02/04/03 03/04/03 02/08/19 02/08/27 
Citycon 02/02/28 02/03/26 03/03/26 02/04/03   
Etteplan 02/03/06 02/03/26 03/03/26 02/05/15 02/05/23 
Finnlines 02/02/25 02/03/15 03/03/15 02/03/15 02/10/25 
Honkarakenne B 02/03/28 02/04/19 03/04/19 02/06/20 02/06/27 
Huhtamäki 02/02/25 02/03/25 03/03/25 02/09/04 02/09/12 
Interavanti 02/01/31 02/02/22 03/02/22 02/02/28 02/03/15 
Jaakko Pöyry 02/02/08 02/03/06 03/03/06 02/03/06 02/09/30 
KCI Konecranes international 02/03/13 02/03/07 03/03/06 02/08/14 02/08/22 
Kekkilä 02/03/22 02/04/09 02/04/09 02/06/24 02/10/02 
Kone 02/01/08 02/02/22 03/02/22 02/05/22 02/05/31 
Kyro 02/02/28 02/03/20 03/03/20 02/08/15   
Martela A 02/02/18 02/03/19 03/03/19 02/04/30 02/05/29 
Norvestia 02/02/18 02/03/20 03/03/19 02/03/20   
Orion-Yhtymä 02/03/04 02/04/15 03/04/15 02/10/11 03/01/02 
Perlos 02/03/19 02/04/11 03/04/11 02/05/03 02/11/08 
Sampo A 02/02/27 02/04/10 03/04/10 02/08/14 02/08/29 
Sponda 02/03/01 02/03/27 03/03/27 02/04/25   
Stora Enso A 02/01/30 02/03/19 03/03/18 02/03/19 02/06/05 
Stora Enso R 02/01/30 02/03/19 03/03/18 02/03/19 02/05/24 
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Tecnomen 02/03/12 02/04/11 03/04/11 02/05/15 02/05/22 
Teleste 02/03/08 02/04/08 03/04/08 02/05/06 02/05/15 
Tulikivi 02/02/20 02/04/04 03/04/04 02/08/26   
Uponor 02/02/05 02/03/13 03/03/13 02/04/23 02/06/12 
Aspo 02/03/25 02/04/25 03/04/25 03/01/08   
Etteplan 03/02/25 03/03/26 04/03/26 03/05/12 03/05/21 
Finnlines  03/02/24 03/03/17 04/03/17 03/03/17   
Fiskars A 03/01/28 03/03/13 04/03/13 03/11/11 03/12/10 
Fiskars K 03/01/28 03/03/13 04/03/13 03/11/11 03/12/15 
Honkarakenne B 03/03/21 04/04/11 04/04/11 03/05/22 03/05/30 
Interavanti 03/01/30 03/02/21 04/02/21 03/02/28 03/03/17 
Jaakko Pöyry Group  03/02/07 03/03/05 04/03/05 03/03/05 03/03/20 
KCI Konecranes International  02/11/26 03/02/20 03/03/05 03/02/12 03/02/20 
Kesla  03/02/10 03/02/28 04/02/28 03/10/22 03/11/03 
Kone  03/02/01 03/02/21 04/02/21 03/04/23   
Kyro  03/02/20 03/03/19 04/03/19 03/03/24   
Nokia 03/01/23 03/03/04 04/03/27 03/03/27 03/04/22 
Nordea 03/03/20 03/04/24 04/04/24 03/10/29 03/11/04 
Panostaja A 03/01/16 03/02/17 04/02/17 03/09/18 03/09/26 
Panostaja B 03/01/16 03/02/17 04/02/17 03/09/18 03/09/26 
Stora Enso A 03/01/30 03/03/20 04/03/19 03/03/20 03/05/13 
Stora Enso R 03/01/30 03/03/20 04/03/19 03/03/20 03/03/27 
Tieto-X 03/03/05 03/03/25 04/03/25 03/04/08 03/04/23 
Uponor  03/02/12 03/03/17 04/03/17 03/03/18 03/03/26 
Aspo  04/02/27 04/04/01 05/04/01 04/05/11 04/05/18 
CapMan B 04/03/11 04/04/01 05/03/31 04/05/27   
Finnair  04/03/09 04/04/07 05/04/06 04/06/18 04/07/01 
Finnlines  04/02/23 04/03/17 05/03/17 04/04/29 04/05/12 
Interavanti 04/01/30 04/02/23 05/02/23 04/03/01 04/03/15 
Kasola  04/03/19 04/04/23 05/04/23 04/06/16 04/08/12 
Kone 04/01/30 04/02/27 05/02/27 04/03/22 04/03/29 
Nokia 04/01/22 04/03/25 05/03/25 04/03/25 04/04/19 
Nordea Bank Ab 04/02/25 04/03/31 05/03/31 04/10/27 04/10/29 
Panostaja  04/01/15 04/02/19 05/02/19 04/03/23 04/03/31 
Perlos  04/03/05 04/03/29 05/03/29 04/11/16 04/11/23 
Stora Enso A 04/02/04 04/03/18 05/03/18 04/03/18 04/04/13 
Stora Enso R 04/02/04 04/03/18 05/03/18 04/03/18 04/03/31 
TietoEnator  04/02/12 04/03/21 05/03/21 04/09/22 04/09/29 
Uponor  04/02/03 04/03/17 05/03/17 04/12/08 04/12/16 
Vacon  04/03/03 04/03/25 05/03/25 04/12/20 04/12/27 
Aspo  05/02/09 05/03/31 06/03/31 05/05/11 05/06/06 
CapMan  05/03/02 05/03/31 06/03/31 05/04/13   
Cargotec  05/05/2 05/07/12 06/07/12 05/07/12 05/10/26 
Finnair  05/03/01 05/03/23 06/03/23 05/08/23 05/09/01 
Honkarakenne  B 05/03/08 05/04/08 06/04/08 05/09/15 05/09/29 
Kasola  05/03/11 05/04/08 06/04/08 05/06/17   
Kemira Growhow  05/03/15 05/04/06 06/04/06 05/12/19 05/12/28 
Kone 05/03/18 05/06/17 05/06/17 05/06/17 05/09/05 
Leo Longlife  05/04/11 05/04/28 06/04/28 05/11/04 05/11/22 
Nokia 05/01/27 05/04/07 06/04/07 05/04/07 05/05/04 
Nordea Bank AB 05/02/23 05/08/04 06/04/04 05/10/26 05/10/31 
Pohjola Yhtymä  04/08/12 04/09/22 05/04/07 05/01/03 05/01/11 
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Pohjola Yhtymä  05/02/09 05/03/17 06/03/17 05/05/04 05/05/11 
Raisio  K 05/02/16 05/03/31 06/03/31 05/08/02 05/08/15 
Raisio  V 05/02/16 05/03/31 06/03/31 05/08/02 05/10/08 
Sampo  05/03/02 05/04/11 06/04/11 05/06/22 05/06/29 
Satama Interactive  05/03/07 05/03/30 06/03/30 05/04/28 05/05/06 
Scanfil  05/03/17 05/04/07 06/04/07 05/05/24 05/06/01 
Sentera  05/03/03 05/03/23 06/03/23 05/08/25 05/09/21 
Stora Enso A 05/02/03 05/03/22 06/03/21 05/03/22 05/03/31 
Stora Enso R 05/02/03 05/03/22 06/03/21 05/03/22 05/03/30 
TietoEnator  05/02/11 05/03/17 06/03/17 05/07/22 05/09/01 
UPM-Kymmene 04/01/29 04/03/24 05/03/21 05/02/01 05/02/09 
UPM-Kymmene 05/02/01 05/03/31 06/03/31 05/03/31 05/04/28 
Uponor  05/02/09 05/03/15 06/03/15 05/03/15 05/03/29 
YIT-Yhtymä 05/02/15 05/03/16 06/03/16 05/03/16 05/12/16 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Share repurchase announcement 
 
FINNAIR OYJ    STOCK EXCHANGE RELEASE   23 AUGUST 2005 AT 14:15 
 
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF FINNAIR PLC APPROVED ACQUISITION OF 
ITS OWN 
SHARES 
 
The Board of Directors of Finnair Plc has decided to acquire the 
Company's own shares through public trading in the Helsinki Exchanges. 
A maximum of 500,000 Finnair shares will be acquired. The acquisition 
will commence on 1 September 2005, at the earliest. 
 
The shares will be acquired in accordance with the authorization given 
to the Board of Directors at the Annual Meeting of Shareholders on 23 
March 2005. The authorization will be effective until 22 March 2006. 
 
Finnair Plc 
Communications 
August 23, 2005 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Example of actual share repuchase announcement 
 
Finnair Corporation                STOCK-EXCHANGE ANNOUNCEMENT 
                                  1.9.2005    
 
 
                                                   
 
SHARE REPURCHASE 1.9.2005 
 
In the Helsinki Stock Exhange 
 
 
Trade date                       1.9.2005 
Bourse trade                    Buy  
Share                               FIA1S 
Amount                           40.000        shares 
Total cost                        371.490,00    EUR 
Average price / share      9,2873        EUR 
Highest price / share       9,32          EUR 
Lowest price  / share       9,24          EUR 
 
       
 
 
Finnair Corporation now holds a total of 425.000 shares including          
the shares repurchased on 1.9.2005 
